KUSUMAVATHI, W/O. SOMAPPA RAI Vs. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, MANGALORE, DAKSHINA KANNADA DISTRICT, THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, PUTTUR, DAKSHINA KANNADA AND THE TAHSILDAR, SULLIA TALUK, DAKSHINA KANNADA DISTRICT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE Appeals assails thz Order dated 12.11.2008 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.37450/2004 and Writ Petition No.37451/2004 which came to be dismissed. Succinctly stated the facts are that a grant of dry land admeasuring 02 acres 38 guntas was made in favour of Balu Naika sun of Koraga Naika on 30.01.1963. The Petitioners/Appellants who has purchased the granted land on 02.06.1978 admits that the grant contained a non -alienation clause for a period of fifteen years; the contention is that the sale took place after 15 years and hence was fully legal. However, the grant was in Form Rs. D' and its translated copy has been filed vide memo dated 31.07.2012. Clause 14 thereof stipulates that - "the lands granted to the depressed class shall not be alienated other than the persons belonging to the depressed class". In 1991, the Assistant Commissioner, Puttur Dakshina Kannada had issued suc -motu notices for resumption of the land under the provisions of the Karnataka Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (hereinafter called 'the PTCL Act' for short) on the premise that the terms of the original grant had been violated. By Order dated 01.04,1992, after concluding that the terms of the grant had been violated, the Assistant Commissioner directed the Tahsildai, Sullia, Dakshina Kannada to take possession of the land in question and distribute it further to persons belonging to the Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe, in accordance with law. The appeal against the Order came to be dismissed on 09.11.1993 and 13.02.1995 by the Deputy Commissioner, Mangalore, Dakshina Kannada. As has now become routine, Writ Petition No.143/1994 came to be filed assailing these concurrent findings which was allowed on 18.11.1996 remanding the dispute back to the Assistant Commissioner Puttur for fresh consideration. Similar orders came to be passed on 10.12.1996 in the Wi -it Petition No.12735/1995 filed by the Appellant No.1. After a fresh hearing, in terms of the Order dated 27.61.1999, the Assistant Commissioner once again directed the Tahsiidar to take possession of the land in question and to distribute it to the Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe community. As in the first round litigation, the Deputy Commissioner dismissed the Appellant's appeal by his Order dated 30.01.2001. The same ladder of litigation has once again been put in place by the filing of Writ Petition No.37450/2004. This time around the Writ Petition has been dismissed. There are therefore, concurrent findings of facts of four adjudications, and the apprehension is that, as in the game of Snakes and Ladders that almost all children have played the original grantee may be returned from the ninety -ninth to the ninth square, not because his case was found legally wanting but because the purchaser in possession has succeeded in prolonging litigation through pernicious remands. Learned counsel for the Appellants has sought to rely on the Division Bench Judgment of this Court iii Laxmamma and etc., etc. Vs. State of Karnataka and Others, AIR 1983 Kant 237 which holds that where the granting authority had imposed a longer period than the one provided by law, only the period permitted by law would be enforceable. This decision is sought to be extrapolated in support of the argument that the grant ostensibly does not specifically contain a covenant to the effect that the granted land can be sold only to another person enjoining the same status of Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe or depressed class. What must be not lost sight of is that the Appellants before us are not the original grantees but rather than the purchasers of the granted land in contravention of the terms of grant. Therefore, they do not possess locus standi to challenge any of its terms. It is for this reason we find that no advantage can be reaped from the observations made in Guntaiah and Others Vs. Hambamma and Others, AIR 2005 SC 4013 , which in turn reproduces paragraph 17 from Manchegowda and Others Vs. State of Karnataka and Others, AIR 1984 SC 1151 speaks to this effect and we can do no better than to extract the following paragraphs from this Three Judge Bench decision. 14. It is also pertinent to note that the prohibition regarding alienation !..s a restrictive covenant binding on the grantee. The grantee is not challenging that condition. In all these proceedings, challenge is made by the third party who purchased the land from the grantee. The third party is not entitled to say that the conditions imposed by the grantor to the grantee were vo.d. As far as the contract of sale is concerned, it was entered into between the Government and the grantee and at that time the third -party purchaser had no interest in such transaction. Of course, he would be entitled to challenge the violation of any statutory provisions but if the grant by itself specifically says that there shall not be any alienation by the grantee for a period of 15 years, that is binding on the grantee so long as he does not challenge that clause, more so when he purchased the land, in spite of being aware of the condition. The Full Bench seriously erred in holding that the land was granted under Rule 43 -J and that the Authorities were not empowered to impose any conditions regarding alienation without adverting to Section 4 of Act 2 of 1979. These lands were given to landless persons almost free of cost and it was done as a social welfare measure to improve the conditions of poor landless persons. When these lands were purchased by third parties taking advantage of illiteracy and poverty of the grantees, Act 2 of 1979 was passed with a view to retrieve these lands from the third -party purchasers. When Act 2 of 1979 was challenged, this Court observed in Manchegowda v. State of Karnataka (SCC pp. 310 -11, Para 17) 17. Granted lands were intended for the benefit and enjoyment of the original grantees who happen to belong to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. At the time of the grant, a condition had been imposed for protecting the interests of the original grantees in the granted lando by restricting the transfer of the same. The condition regarding the prohibition on transfer of such granted lands for a specified period, was imposed by virtue of the specific term in the grant itself or by reason of any law, rule or regulation governing such grant. It was undoubtedly open to the grantor at the time of granting lands to the original grantees to stipulate such a condition the condition being a term of the grant itself, and the condition was imposed in the interests of the grantee. Except on the basis of such a condition the grantor might not have made any such grant at ali. The condition imposed against the transfer for a particular period of such granted lands which were granted essentially for the benefit of the grantees cannot be said to constitute any unreasonable restriction. The granted lands were not in the nature of properties acquired and held by the grantees in the sense of acquisition, or holding of property within the meaning of Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution, It was a case of a grant by the owner of the land to the grantee for the possession and enjoyment of the granted lands by the grantees and the prohibition on transfer of such granted lands for the specified period was an essential term or condition on the basis of which the grant was made. It has to be pointed out that the prohibition on transfer was not for an indefinite period or perpetual. It was only for a particular period, the object being that the grantees should enjoy the granted lands themselves at least for the period during which the prohibition was to remain operative. Experience had shown that persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes to whom the lands were granted were, because of their poverty, lack of education and general backwardness, exploited by various persons who could and would take advantage of the sad plight of these poor persons for depriving them of their lands. The imposition of the condition of prohibition on transfer for a particular period could not, therefore, be considered to constitute any unreasonable restriction on the right of the grantees to dispose of the granted lands. The imposition of such a condition on prohibition in the very nature of the grant was perfectly valid and legal. This exposition of law finds reiteration in Chinde Gowda Vs. Puttamma (2007) 12 Supreme Court Cases 618.

(2.) IT is appropriate and necessary to note that as per the translation of Form D' produced by the Appellants vide Memo dated 3 L07.2012, there can be no cavil that the grant contained a restriction on transfer within the first 15 years and more importantly to any person who did not belong to the Depressed classes' or to the Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe community. On the application of the ratio of the three Judgments of the Apex Court the grantee alone could have challenged any of the clauses in the Grant; the Appellants do not possess locus standi in this regard. The Division Bench of this Court has also considered this very proposition of law in great detail decision in WA No.16380/2011 disposed of on 10.11.2011, WA No.15234/2011 disposed of on 02.12.2011, WA No.16952/2011 disposed of on 14.12.2011 and WA No.1736/2009 disposed of on 23.05.2012.

(3.) THE Appeal is accordingly devoid of merit and is dismissed. The Orders of the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner be complied with within four weeks from today and a status report to this effect be filed with the Registrar General of this Court within one week thereafter.