LAWS(KAR)-2012-4-80

SHASHIKALA H. GOWDA, W/O L. HANUMANTHE GOWDA Vs. THE COMMISSIONER, CORPORATION OF CITY OF BANGALORE, NOW CALLED AS BRUHATH BANGALORE MAHANAGARA PALIKE, N.R. SQUARE, BANGALORE, ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, BRUHATH BANGALORE MAHANAGARA PALIKE, WA

Decided On April 20, 2012
Shashikala H. Gowda, W/O L. Hanumanthe Gowda Appellant
V/S
Commissioner, Corporation Of City Of Bangalore, Now Called As Bruhath Bangalore Mahanagara Palike, N.R. Square, Bangalore, Assistant Executive Engineer, Bruhath Bangalore Mahanagara Palike, Wa Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner has called into question the order, dated 10.4.2012 (Annexure -H) passed by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal ('KAT' for short) dismissing the petitioner's appeal. In the said appeal the petitioner had challenged the order, dated 4.6.2010. The Tribunal has dismissed the appeal in view of the passing of the subsequent order on 18.12.2010 by the respondent No. 2 in exercise of the power conferred by Section 321(3) of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 ('the said Act' for short). Sri N.S. Satish Chandra, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the order, dated 18.12.2010 was not communicated to the petitioner. He submits that: the passing of such an order was not even mentioned by the respondents in the proceedings before the KAT. The KAT noticed it while perusing the L.C.R.s and dismissed the appeal.

(2.) ON this Court asking Sri S.V. Angadi, the learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 as to whether the order, dated 18.12.2310 came to be served on the petitioner, he submits that the order, dated 18.12.2010 was pasted on the suit schedule property.

(3.) THE submission that the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 have pasted the order, dated 18.12.2010 does not commend itself to me. The respondent authorities ought to have sent the order under RPAD. Only on the registered postal envelope coming back unserved, it was open to them to affix the order on the suit schedule property. It should not have been done in the first instance itself, mere so when the petitioner's valuable rights in the immovable property are involved.