LAWS(KAR)-2012-10-13

PUSHPA JAIN Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA

Decided On October 04, 2012
PUSHPA JAIN Appellant
V/S
STATE OF KARNATAKA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) It is the case of the petitioner that she is the absolute owner of property bearing Survey No. 14/2 measuring about 4 acres 32 guntas of Kodigerahalli, Yelahanka Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk, which she had purchased under two registered sale-deeds. She had purchased 2 acres 10 guntas and 8 guntas of kharab under a sale-deed dated 30.1.1982 from M. Channappa, son of Muni Channappa, and 2 acres and 10 guntas and 8 guntas of kharab from one Suvarna, daughter of late Dr. Sunderraj under & sale-deed dated 12.2.1982. Pursuant to the purchase, mutation entries were made in her name with effect from the year 1981-82. The two items of property, are contiguously situated, and the petitioner had developed the same and grown coconut trees, which were about 25 years old as on the date of the petition and had erected a compound wall all around the property. She had even obtained an endorsement from the Bangalore Development Authority (Hereinafter referred to as 'the BDA' for brevity), issued by the Additional Land Acquisition Officer, BDA, dated 4.3.1982, to the effect that the land in question was not subject to any acquisition Proceedings. The petitioner claimed that she has remained in peaceful possession from the date of her purchase. She has obtained conversion of the land for residential purposes from the competent authority as per order dated 19.7.1996 and had paid a conversion fee of 3.76 lakh as on 26.6.1996. It transpires that the City Municipal Council, (Hereinafter referred to as 'the CMC', for brevity) Byatarayanapura, Bangalore had proposed to acquire land to an extent of 3500 square feet of the petitioner and the petitioner had voluntarily surrendered the same, while seeking for exemption of payment of developmental charges. The said CMC is now within the jurisdiction of the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (Hereinafter referred to as the 'BBMP', for brevity) and accordingly, she has been paying taxes to the BBMP, Bangalore.

(2.) The learned Senior Advocate Shri. Ashok Haranahalli appearing for the learned counsel for the petitioner would reiterate the above facts and circumstances and would demonstrate that the layout said to have been formed by the fourth respondent is separated from the petitioner's land by a road. No part of the layout is formed over the petitioner's land and possession could not have been taken of any portion of the petitioner's land as it is surrounded by a compound wall. The 23 guntas of land indicated as having been acquired, is in the middle of the petitioner's property and there is no access to the said area unless the compound wall is breached and since the petitioner has continuously remained in possession, it is prima facie established that the petitioner's land has never been the subject matter of acquisition proceedings. In any event, possession has continued to remain with the petitioner and therefore, the alleged notification issued under Section 16(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Hereinafter referred to as 'the LA Act', for brevity) is clearly a got-up document, without reference to the actual state of affairs. The petition having been filed in the year 2008, cannot be said to be barred by delay and laches, as the petitioner was completely in the dark of any alleged acquisition proceedings, as she had no personal notice of the same and she has not been disturbed from the property even as on the date of the petition and it is only on the issuance of a public notice immediately preceding the petition, that the petitioner has learnt of the mischief and is therefore before this court seeking appropriate reliefs.

(3.) The fourth respondent has entered appearance and has filed statement of objections vehemently opposing the petition. The learned Counsel appearing for the fourth respondent would contend that the petition is liable to be rejected at the threshold on the ground of delay and laches. The land was the subject matter of a Preliminary Notification of the year 1983 and Final Notification of the year 1985 and the claim of the petitioner that she has purchased the property in the year 1982, is presumed to be aware of the notifications and therefore, the casual explanation sought to be advanced to explain the inordinate delay, cannot be accepted on the face of it. The acquisition proceedings have culminated in the land vesting in the State and possession having been handed over to the fourth respondent as of the year 1992 is evidenced by Annexures - R. 2 and R. 3 and therefore, the acquisition proceedings cannot be subjected to challenge in the writ petition.