JAYARAJA HEGDE Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE Appellant before us is the son of one Shrimathi Heggadthi. The Appellant had filed Writ Petition No. 35363 of 1996 on 19.12.1996 assailing an Order of the Tribunal dated 12.8.1986. The Tribunal had granted occupancy rights to the Respondent -3 Yuvaraja Poovani in respect of several pieces of land situated at Marne Village. Though there is a serious dispute with regard to many other aspects of the case, one factor which emerges predominant is that the lands that are in dispute were held by Sri Chandranatha Swamy Devaru Madhura Patna, Basadi (Basti), hereinafter referred to as the "temple". It appears that the parties are followers of the Jain faith and that under certain circumstances, as often happens, large areas of lands which include these lands had effectively vested in the temple. The third Respondent had filed Form No. 7 before the Tribunal claiming occupancy rights in respect of these nine pieces of land and on the first occasion, his application came to be rejected. The rejection Order was ultimately set aside by the High Court and the proceeding was remanded to the Tribunal for a fresh decision. It was on the second occasion, that the Tribunal passed the impugned Order on 12.8.1986 granting occupancy rights in favour of the third Respondent. We may briefly record here that the Tribunal has passed a very short Order wherein it records the fact that the tenancy of the third Respondent had been conceded on behalf of the temple and the other observation made is that the Village records have been verified and that the Tribunal has accordingly granted the occupancy rights. On the face of it, since the Order indicates that the tenancy rights were virtually conceded, the matter rested there. In the year 1991, the present Appellant's mother Shrimathi Heggadthi who claims to be one of the devotees of the temple filed a Civil Petition before the High Court challenging the Order of the Tribunal. At that point of time, since the appellate authority under the Land Reforms Act had been abolished, it was customary to file a Civil Petition requesting the High Court to call for the records in respect of the appeals that had been filed and to treat the same as a Writ Petition and to hear and dispose of the case on merits. The Civil Petition appears to have been taken up for hearing before the High Court in the year 1995 at which time, it was pointed out to the High Court that the Civil Petition would be maintainable provided an appeal had been preferred against the original Order of the Tribunal and that since the Petitioner before the High Court had not filed any such appeal, that the Civil Petition was not maintainable. It transpires that the Petitioner's mother Shrimathi Heggadthi withdrew the Civil Petition. In out considered view, since it does transpire that no appeal had been filed by her against the original Order, whether the Civil Petition was dismissed or whether it was withdrawn, would make very little difference. The only rider which we need to add is that Shrimathi Heggadthi was not a party to the proceedings before the Tribunal and consequently, whether at all she would have had the locus to file an appeal is debatable. However, we shall deal with that aspect of the law presently.

(2.) ON 19.12.1996, the present Appellant filed Writ Petition No. 35363 of 1996 assailing the original Order of the Tribunal dated 12.8.1986. Admittedly, there was a delay of 11 years and the Appellant had given certain reasons for the delay which have been gone into by the learned Single Judge who has examined the law on the point very carefully and has come to the conclusion that on the facts of the present case, the delay is not liable to be condoned and that the petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. The learned Single Judge has however, proceeded to observe that since the Order is an appealable Order, that he is also examining the case on merits, which he has done and he has recorded the finding that no interference is warranted as far as the Tribunal's Order is concerned. This appeal has been directed against the Order of the learned Single Judge.

(3.) ON facts, Sri Ariga, learned Counsel who represents the contesting Respondents showed us the various parts of the record and some of the earlier statements on the basis of which he submitted that Lingappa Hegde was in fact the Moktesar for several years, almost until his death and that consequently, the charge to the effect that he had misrepresented his position to the Tribunal is false. Secondly, what the learned Counsel brings to our notice is that Sri Kattada has clearly pointed out to the Tribunal that Lingappa could not remain present due to ill -health and that he had been fully authorised through a letter which is on record, to represent the temple and make the necessary statement. On facts, we find that since the allegation has come from the Appellant's side, that it was incumbent upon the Appellant to have established that Lingappa and kattada had in fact acted without authority. A mere allegation has been made which has not been substantiated and a careful scrutiny of the relevant parts of the record which we have done with the able assistance of the learned Counsel very clearly indicates that Lingappa was in -charge of the management of the temple for a considerable period of time which includes the time relevant as far as the present case is concerned and that consequently, he was competent to depose on behalf of the temple. There is also no dispute about the fact that Kattada, who has corroborated him, was duly authorised by him and that he has supported the version put forward by Lingappa. Fraud is a serious charge even in civil law and it is well settled that the allegation is required to be fully substantiated before the Court upholds it and this is a case in which we do not find the Appellant having discharged this burden whereas on the other hand, the Respondents have satisfied the Court that the charge does not appear to be true. In this background, the only right conclusion which the Court can arrive at is that the charge of fraud has not been established and if this charge fails, then Mr. Bhat's subsidiary argument that since the Order itself is vitiated in law, that a belated challenge should not be struck down, also becomes untenable.