(1.) WE have heard the learned Additional S. P. P. and the learned Advocate E. R. Diwakar who was appointed as Amicus Curiae by the Court on behalf of respondents-accused. Despite service of notice from this Court the accused have not only remained absent but they were also un-represented. After hearing the appellant's learned counsel we were of the view that the appeal will have to be allowed and consequently appointed an Amicus Curiae counsel and adjourned the hearing to enable the respondents' learned counsel to get ready with the case.
(2.) WE have heard the learned counsel on both sides. The appellant's learned counsel has pointed out to us that PWs. 1 and 2 both of whom were injured and their friends have supported their versions and no independent witnesses have been examined. His submission is that in a case of the present type where the evidence of the injured persons is perfectly good and acceptable and where the medical evidence corroborates their testimony, that even if the independent witnesses are not available that a prosecution is perfectly sustainable. As against this position, respondents' learned counsel submits that admittedly there was some background of a dispute or hostility between the two groups and that consequently it would be unsafe to rely on the evidence of the interested persons and that the learned trial Magistrate was right in having insisted on independent corroboration.
(3.) IT is necessary for us to observe here that in case after case, where there is perfectly good evidence from the injured person and where there is no requirement of law that third parties or independent witnesses should be available, that for some strange reason, the trial Judges or Magistrates have been acquitting the accused resulting in total miscarriage of justice. The reasons set out in the present judgment for the acquittal of the accused are totally unsustainable and, it would be necessary that the trial Courts particularly the Judicial Officer who has delivered this judgment should ensure that orders of this type should not be passed in future. It is such orders that are giving rise to the unnecessary spate of appeals against the acquittals which would not have been necessary had the cases been properly decided in the first instance.