H T SRIMATHI RAO Vs. PRAFULLA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) I have heard the petitioner"s learned advocate on merits as also the learned advocate who represents the contesting caveators. A strong plea is advanced to the Court that if it can be demonstrated that the petitioner possessed or came to possess certain rights by virtue of the Will that the petitioner should not be non-suited only on the ground of gross delay or the principles of limitation. The real issue is far deeper insofar as the petitioner had filed the impleading application in the year 1994 at which point of time itself, that application was hopelessly belated because the original plaintiff had passed away in the year 1991. That application itself could not have ever been granted by the Court unless the Court was satisfied in some exceptional circumstances that there was valid ground for condonation of delay. What has thereafter aggravated of the position is that the petitioner filed an application for condonation of delay after a lapse of another 7 years along with the application for setting aside the abatement of the suit. It is these 3 IAs that are being disposed off through a common order which is the subject matter of the present CRP.

(2.) ONE of the contentions raised was that the petitioner"s husband who was an advocate practicing on the criminal side was not aware of the principles and requirements of Civil law. Such an argument is totally untenable and cannot even be considered by this Court. Second contention was that during the pendency of the CRP the petitioner was under the impression that there was no need to file the requisite applications before the Trial Court. This position is also erroneous in law. Furthermore what was contended was that the principles of limitation have always been construed beneficially that the Courts have invariably condoned even the gross delay if the petitioner is agitating valuable rights and these would be frustrated. There are cases and it is true that in some instances the Court does condone the delay even of a reasonably long period. None of those principles would hold good in this case because effectively the delay is of 10 years if one were to compute the point of time between the death of the plaintiff and the point of time when the IAs. 28 and 29 were filed. The reasons given are also weak and totally untenable and the principle that would apply in the present case that even if one claims to have rights, that those rights must be agitated within the time prescribed by law as otherwise those rights stand extinguished. The contention that is urged before me that the petitioner is agitating valuable rights, is therefore a misnomer because with the passage of time itself it would be difficult to contend that any rights have survived. What was sought to be done here is really to revive the proceeding and the learned Judge has very rightly applied her mind to the law on the point and has decided the applications strictly in consonance with the well settled principles of law. In this background no case is made out for interference and the CRP accordingly fails and stands dismissed. The petitioner"s learned advocate submitted that some other proceedings are also pending and one of his submissions was that this CRP should await the outcome of those proceedings. For good reason this Court has not acceded to this request. He has also submitted that this order should not affect any other proceedings. The position in law is that when the Court passes an order, that order will have its inevitable consequences.

(3.) THE CRP accordingly fails and stands dismissed. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.