STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. NEELAWWA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is one more unfortunate case where the allegation is of wife burning but unlike all the other prosecutions, the accused before us is the mother-in-law of the deceased Parawwa. The case raises a slightly different aspect of the law with regard to the appreciation of a dying declaration as we shall presently point out, but the prosecution had alleged that Parawwa was married on 8-6-1991 to Gangappa and there is the usual allegation that a certain amount of cash and gold by way of dowry had changed hands. The incident in question took place on 13-3-1992 i. e. about nine months after the couple were married and it is alleged that the accused who is the mother-in-law and her two daughters were repeatedly harassing and torturing Parawwa as they were demanding another amount of Rs. 10,000/- and four tolas of gold by way of further dowry. On 13-3-1992 a commotion took place at the house at about 5 a. m. and the neighbours and other persons rushed there only to find that Parawwa's clothes were on fire. The accused and others are supposed to have put off the flames and taken her to hospital and the cause of the burning as initially disclosed by Parawwa was that it was an accident. The statement or dying declaration of Parawwa which is Ex. P. 16 was recorded at about 11. 30 a. m. on the same day and considering the fact that she had sustained 96% to 98% burns, it is not surprising that she died on the same evening. In the dying declaration Parawwa had implicated her mother-in-law and her version was that the accused along with her two daughters had physically dragged her to the bathroom, that they had overpowered her, doused her clothes in kerosene and set fire to the same. The daughters being juveniles were not arraigned as accused in the present prosecution but the mother-in-law was arrested and chargesheeted for having committed offences punishable under Ss. 498-A and 302, IPC. The learned trial Judge after a detailed analysis of the evidence recorded an order of acquittal and the present appeal is directed by the State against that order. Since the accused was not represented, learned Advocate Sharada Havanur was appointed as amicus curiae. Unfortunately, the said Advocate has remained absent but, the learned S. P. P. has done a very thorough job in taking us through the whole of the record in the course of his submissions. We have had occasion to review the record and to reconsider the judgment and we need to briefly indicate below our reasons for having arrived at the conclusion that this is not a case that calls for interference.

(2.) THE evidence in this case essentially falls into three groups. The first of them is with regard to the parents and relations of the deceased-Parawwa who allege that they were made to pay a dowry consisting of a certain amount of cash and ornaments and it is on this basis that the additional charge under Ss. 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act has been framed. While it is true that the learned S. P. P. has submitted that the Courts will have to take judicial notice of the fact that there is no matrimonial alliance where demands are not made and where money, ornaments and property does not pass hands and that consequently, the learned trial Judge was in error in having disregarded the clear evidence which unequivocally indicated that cash of Rs. 15,000/- and four tolas of gold by way of dowry were extorted from the girl's parents, he has relied on the fact that the girl's father who is P. W. 6 has also referred to this fact and it is his submission that only because these persons had not lodged any police complaint with regard to the subsequent demand of Rs. 10,000/- and four tolas of gold that the whole of the evidence has been discarded and it is his submission that in cases where additional demands are made and the parents cannot meet them, that they would be very fearful of bringing the police authorities into the picture. This would virtually bring an end to the marriage. The submission is that in the absence of this evidence having been broken down in cross-examination and in the absence of the defence establishing that these persons are unworthy of credibility that a conviction under Ss. 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as also under S. 498-A, I. P. C. is called for because they have deposed to the fact that Parawwa had complained to them that she was being harassed and tortured in order to secure considerable economic benefit.

(3.) WE do see considerable justification in the submissions that have been canvassed and we have very carefully gone through the reasoning and findings of the trial Court as far as these charges are concerned. The learned Judge has found that these are an obvious afterthought for a variety of reasons and having regard to the very low credibility levels that have emerged in the course of the evidence of these witnesses, the Court has almost recorded a finding that the subsequent allegations border on fabrication. Several reasons have been set out, the principal one being that there was total non-action on the part of the parents and while we do concede that the learned S. P. P. is perhaps right when he points out that delicate family disputes if taken to the police authorities would lead to a total blast up of the marriage, we are equally aware of the fact that there are many other channels such as the village panchayat, elders of the family on both sides and other well-wishers and the fact that there was total silence on the part of the parents in respect of these heads of charge does give rise to a great suspicion with regard to the credibility. It is only on this ground that the accused has got the benefit of doubt and having regard to the quality of the evidence we see no ground on which one can interfere with that finding. The order of acquittal under these heads of charge is therefore confirmed.