STATE Vs. C SHIVASHANKARA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) WE have heard the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor and the learned Counsel who represents the respondent-accused. This is one more case where the prosecution alleges that the death of deceased saraswathi was dowry related, the allegation being that the accused is supposed to have been demanding that in addition to whatever was received at the time of the marriage that she should secure for him a motor-cycle and a share in the house property of her father and that these should be made over to the accused husband. The couple were married for about 3 years and there is one daughter born out of the wedlock. According to the prosecution, the accused respondent-husband was responsible for having poured kerosene on the cloths of the deceased saraswathi and set her on fire on 13-4-1991 at about 4 P. M. The admitted position is that Saraswathi sustained 100% burn injuries and that she did not survive the incident. Consequently, this is one case in which there is no dying declaration from the victim and the prosecution relies heavily on secondary evidence. The learned Trial Judge has evaluated the record and held that the charges are unsubstantiated and it is against the order of acquittal that the State has preferred the present appeal.

(2.) THE learned Additional State Public Prosecutor has submitted that if the evidence of P. Ws. 7 and 8 who are the father and mother is accepted and the evidence of P. W. 13-Manjula who is the sister is used to corroborate their evidence, that there is ample material on record to hold that the accused was responsible for the death of Saraswathi. The charge is to the effect that during the period 20-4-1988 to 13-4-1991 the accused is alleged to have been harassing, torturing and pressurising the deceased Saraswathi in order to secure additional dowry by way of property and that consequently, they have virtually driven her to suicide. At an earlier stage this Court quashed the charges under Section 498-A of the IPC and the allied charges and consequently, only the charge under Section 302 of the IPC has survived for consideration. Though there is no direct evidence, it was sought to be alleged that the a1-husband had poured kerosene on the cloths of the deceased and ignited them but there is absolutely no evidence to support this contention. Learned Additional State Public Prosecutor therefore falls back on the evidence of P. Ws. 7, 8 and 13 who have clearly deposed to the effect that certain amount of property had changed hands prior to the marriage and that there was some trouble between the husband and the wife as a result of which on each occasion the wife used to go back to the husband's house and only after panchayats were held, elders had intervened and pressure was put on her to return. The submission canvassed before us is that like in all this class of cases the Court is required to draw the requisite adverse inference from whatever material the prosecuti on has been able to bring on record. The learned Additional State public Prosecutor submits that there is corroboration to the aforesaid evidence from P. W. 9-Mathew who is the neighbour and P. W. 12-Sumalatha who is the younger sister and that the order of acquittal deserves interference with.

(3.) ON behalf of the accused the learned Counsel submits that if the prosecution evidence itself were to be carefully scrutinized, it will be seen that there is an unequivocal admission brought on record particularly from P. W. 8, the mother that the relationships between the parties were cordial. Again, he relies on the evidence of P. W. 12 who is the younger sister who also confirms this position. What is submitted is that even if there were some misunderstandings between husband and wife which did require the intervention of the elders that the prosecution ought to have examined one of those persons in order to specifically indicate as to what the nature of the problem was and that in the absence thereof, it is not open to the learned Additional State Public prosecutor to allege that this was dowry related harassment. Furthermore, what is pointed out is that even if evidence of P. Ws. 7, 8, 12 and 13 were taken cumulatively it does not contain any material that is of such gravity as to support either of the two possibilities, the first being that the accused were so hostile to Saraswathi that they were responsible for her death or the alternate possibility is that they had created a situation whereby she was pushed to a position of desperation and committed suicide being left with no other option. The submission therefore is that in the absence of any cogent material the order of acquittal was fully justified.