CHANDRASHEKAR Vs. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER AND LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) WE have heard the learned Advocate who appears in favour of the cross-objectors as also the learned Government Pleader who represents the respondents. The first point that has been canvassed before us is with regard to the aspect of maintainability of these cross-objections because of the peculiar facts relating to the present appeal. Admittedly, the LAO had determined the market value of the lands in question at rs. 19,090/- per acre. The reference was made to the Civil Court for enhancement of compensation which was ultimately enhanced to Rs. 1,03,000/- per acre. The State had preferred M. F. A. ' No. 2107 of 1994 contending that the enhancement was excessive and an earlier Bench of this Court dismissed the appeal in question. The real question is as to whether the cross-objections would survive in these circumstances. One contention that is invariably raised on behalf of the acquiring authorities is that where the High Court has dismissed the main appeal, that cross-objections which are nothing other than an off-shoot of the main proceeding cannot survive independently. The obvious logic behind this contention is that where the High Court has gone into the question of whether the compensation is excessive and where the appeal has been dismissed that it is obvious that the High Court has set its seal of approval on the quantum of compensation and that consequently, this aspect both factual and legal cannot be agitated. The law on the point has effectively been settled by an earlier decision of this Court in Assistant Commissioner and Land Acquisition Officer, Gulbarga v Chandrashekar. There can be hardly any dispute about the correct position in law any longer because the dismissal of the State appeal would ipso facto only mean that the compensation that has been awarded cannot or ought not to be reduced and that the Court approves of the scale and the quantum. The law does visualise situations in which the beneficiary is aggrieved by the quantum awarded by the Civil Court and therefore desires to independently reagitate that issue and it would therefore be wrong to construe that this challenge which seeks a further upward revision of the compensation cannot survive if the State appeal has been dismissed. We hold that it is certainly open to the aggrieved party to independently maintain the cross-objections because this Court needs to visualise a situation wherein, in a given case the acquiring authority does not question the quantum awarded by the Civil Court even if it has been enhanced because it is considered to be fair and reasonable or even found to be in consonance with the well-defined principles. There may be areas which the beneficiary desires to still agitate and it would therefore he wrong and improper to hold that the further agitation of these issues is totally interdependent on a State appeal. In any event, since the law has now been settled, the maintainability of these cross-objections can no longer be questioned.

(2.) THERE are only two points that have been agitated by the appellants' learned Advocate. The first of them is with regard to the head of deduction that has been applied by the lower Court. We do not really need to reiterate in detail all that has been elaborately set out by the learned Judge but the admitted position appears to be that this land though on the date of acquisition was still categorised as agricultural land was located within the Gulbarga city and that it is very close to, adjoining and in fact almost surrounded by a whole lot of areas where considerable amount of development has already taken place. It is also adjoining a main road and consequently, the Trial Court has very rightly applied the concept of building potential while deciding the market value. The learned Judge has however deducted 33% towards development of roads, drainage, etc. , and has added on an another 20% by virtue of the decision in K. S. Shivadevamma and Others v Assistant Commissioner and Land Acquisition Officer, Davanagere and Another, and it is really the 53% figure which has been seriously assailed by Mr. Shankar. Though he did seriously argue that in a given instance it is permissible for a party to contend that unlike the no-development zone, if it is demonstrated that there has been considerable amount of building activity and development and infrastructure that has come up adjoining the acquired lands, that there would be no further investment under the head of developmental expenses and that consequently no deduction is permissible. He has however, in the light of the various decisions of the courts limited his submission contending that deduction must be limited to 339%

(3.) THE learned Government Pleader did advance a submission which requires consideration. He submitted that even if the development has taken place as is the admitted position in the adjoining area and in the vicinity, that the Court cannot lose sight of the fact that this particular piece of land which is under acquisition had not been converted to non-agricultural use as on the date of acquisition, that it was in its original shape, viz. . designated as agricultural land and more importantly, what the learned Counsel submitted before us was that when it comes to the investment on infrastructural facility which is the ground for deduction the Court cannot lose sight of the fact that some investment will still be required to carry those facilities or bring them to the present land or for that matter to run them through the present land. His submission was that the lower Court was fully justified in applying the 53% formula because the development in the adjoining area will have to be ignored in so far as considerable investment is still necessary to bring those factors up to the present plot of land.