MUKUNDA Vs. K RADHAKRISHNA PAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) I have heard the learned Advocates on both sides. These two petitions are directed against the common order passed by the revisional court whereby the respondent's revision was allowed and the petitioner's revision was dismissed.

(2.) MR. Goulay, learned Counsel who represents the petitioner raised a preliminary issue viz. , that the revision filed by the respondent in the year 2001 challenging the adverse finding recorded by the Trial Court in the year 1990 under Section 21 (l) (p) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 was hopelessly time-barred and that the lower Court ought to have upheld this bar and dismissed the petition at its very inception. He has relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v Patel raghav Natha and Others, wherein the Supreme Court had occasion while dealing with revision proceedings in that instance to point out that despite the fact that no specified period of limitation had been prescribed that a revision is not maintainable after a reasonable period of time has elapsed. The Supreme Court also has elaborated that consequences of entertaining belated revisions would be extremely harsh and disastrous to the opposite party and consequently, that the concept of a reasonable time frame is implicit. I need to clarify here that there are several distinguishing features, the first of them being that the Supreme court was dealing with a statutory provision under Section 211 of the bombay Land Revenue Act and one of the predominant reasons as stated by the Supreme Court why the principle was laid down was because the respondent would be adversely affected if the authorities were to be given a blank jurisdiction to exercise revisional powers at any belated stage. The facts of that case and the facts of the present case are entirely different. I do concede that there is considerable substance in the principle of law enunciated by the learned Counsel but, the question arises as to whether it would have universal application in all instances and furthermore, whether in the present case, at this stage after the revisional Authority has entertained the revision petition, the petitioner has accepted that position, argued the case, lost it and then comes to the High Court, it is permissible to go backwards and challenge the maintainability of that proceeding. To my mind, the petitioner is estopped from raising a plea at this point of time but, more importantly what needs to be seen is that we have a rather peculiar position here viz. , that it was the petitioner who had challenged the adverse verdict of the Trial Court and those proceedings were pending. Obviously it then came to the notice of the respondent or his Advocates that the adverse finding under Section 21 (l) (p) which had been recorded by the Trial court and ought to have been technically challenged, had not been done and it was more in the nature of a corrective that the revision was filed, which would have made a difference. Though the revision was filed in the first instance but, what virtually saves the respondent is the fact that the proceedings were in any case pending, the revisional Court was seized of the matter and it was almost on par with a situation wherein a litigant seeks the permission of the Court to raise an additional ground or an additional plea or an additional point of fact or law. Under the circumstances, to my mind, some dilution of the principle will have to be accepted and I see no reason why at this late stage this Court should uphold the plea that the respondent's revision was not maintainable.

(3.) THE second plea that has been canvassed by the petitioner's leaned Advocate arises out of the unholy confusion that has been created by the legislature by putting in the provision in Section 70 of the karnataka Rent Act, 1999 that in respect of pending proceedings, they will have to be disposed off under the provisions of the new Act. It would have been far more rational. , sensible and logical and to my mind, legal for the legislature to have applied sub-clause (1) of Section 70 to pending proceedings because, a serious anomaly does arise in several instances where the parties have litigated on the basis of provisions of a particular statute and they are required to virtually somersault by virtue of the change of the provisions of law.