(1.) WE have heard the learned State Public Prosecutor for the State and the respondents' learned Counsel on merits.
(2.) THE incident in this case occurred at about 2. 15 p. m. on 27-9-1989 at Rampura Village. The deceased, Shrishail Nagappa Guddodagi (hereinafter referred to as 'nagappa') is alleged to have been assaulted by 7 accused, out of whom it is alleged that accused 6-Chandrawwa threw chilli powder in the eyes of the deceased and that the remaining six persons assaulted him with deadly weapons as a result of which he sustained injuries and died at the spot. The incident is alleged to have been witnessed by P. Ws. 1 and 2 namely, the wife and the father and by several other persons some of whom have not been examined and others who have not supported the prosecution case. The Dalapathi reported the matter to the police who came to the spot commenced investigation, and arrested the accused persons. On completion of the investigation the accused were charge-sheeted for having committed offences punishable under Sections 148 and 149 read with Section 302 of the IPC. The learned Trial Judge after a detailed analysis of the evidence acquitted the accused and, one of the principal reasons for this was because the accused 7 had sustained an injury of some seriousness as a result of an axe blow and the Trial Court took the view that the suppression of this material fact and the non-explanation of the injury was fatal to the prosecution case. The State has assailed the correctness of the order of acquittal.
(3.) THE learned State Public Prosecutor who appears in support of the appeal as also the respondents' learned Counsel Sri Kalyana Shetty have taken us through the record of which we have done a thorough view. The principal submission canvassed on behalf of the appellants is that, this is a case in which the wife who is P. W. 1, Smt. Sayawwa has wrongly been disbelieved. She has very clearly deposed to the effect that she was in the house when the incident took place, she has referred to the presence of her father-in-law who is P. W. 2 and she states that when she heard the commotion she had gone out and that she witnessed the entire incident. She has squarely implicated all the seven accused and has stated that it was because of the assault by them that her husband lost his life. The learned State Public Prosecutor submits that the ground on which this evidence has been discarded is unsustainable, because he points out that the Court has overlooked the fact that having regard to the status of the witness who is only a village woman and being a wife who has witnessed her own husband being brutally assaulted must be given a certain level of allowance. It is true that the police have not taken charge of her saree which she says was bloodstained. It is also true that there are some minor infirmities with regard to the presence or otherwise of the child but the main body of the evidence virtually remains unshakable. Similarly, the learned State public Prosecutor has relied on the evidence of P. W. 2 who is the father and he again points out that this witness is a natural witness and that he has very clearly identified all the seven accused and implicated them in the incident and that his evidence is fully corroborated by the evidence of P. W. 1. Here again, the attack as far as his evidence is concerned is that there are some minor inconsistencies with regard to his having taken the child to get some medicine, with regard to the aspect of his clothes being bloodstained, with regard to minor contradictions between the police statement and his evidence. Again the learned State public Prosecutor vehemently submits that as far as the main incident is concerned that his evidence not only corroborates the evidence of P. W. 1 but that it is in consonance with the medical evidence, namely, the injuries on the deceased. On the basis of this material, the learned state Public Prosecutor submits that regardless of other witnesses having turned hostile that the prosecution has established a caseagainst all the seven accused and that the order of acquittal requires to be interfered with.