STATE Vs. PUTTARANGAPPA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE state of Karnataka has assailed the acquittal of the respondent- accused in sessions case No. 25 of 1990 disposed of by the learned sessions judge, tumkur on 28-7-1995. The prosecution alleges that the husband puttarangappa had suspected the fidelity of his wife Smt. Rangamma and that on the morning of 7-12-1989 at about 6. 30 a. m. In front of the house occupied by them in the village he had brutally assaulted the deceased wife with a machu. The condition of the body clearly indicates that the assault was a savage one with the majority of blows aimed at the face and neck of the deceased as a result of which she died on the spot. The prosecution case is that p. ws. 1 and 2 who arrived on the scene very shortly after the incident found the accused with the machu in his hands, that they had snatched it from him and after disarming him that he was tied up and kept there until the arrival of the police. The investigation was concluded and the accused was charged with an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and the learned trial judge after considering the evidence which essentially consists of the depositions of the p. ws. 1 and 2 and some other supportive evidence recorded an order of acquittal. The state has appealed against that order and after admission of the state appeal since the respondent-accused who is an agriculturist and obviously belongs to the weaker sections of the society had not entered any appearance, learned Advocate Sri sandesh j. Chouta was appointed as amicus curiae on his behalf.

(2.) WE have heard the learned state public prosecutor in support of the appeal and the learned Advocate who represents the original accused. The principal thrust of the arguments advanced by the learned state public prosecutor centers around the fact that the p. ws. 1 and 2 are totally independent persons, that they have neither an animus nor any conceivable reason for falsely implicating the accused, that the facts of the case are such as would virtually speak for themselves and that consequently, the learned trial judge was in error in having applied too rigorous a test to the evidence of rustic villagers and that consequently, this is a case which calls for interference. Though the learned state public prosecutor conceded the fact that there are no eye-witnesses to the incident he was quick to point out to us that P. W. 2-govinda reddy who is again an independent witness states that when he was walking back from his lands the accused himself called out to him and told him that he has killed his wife and that he should come there and see what has happened. The submission is that it was very obvious that the accused was infuriated with the deceased-rangarnma and even assuming that the evidence with regard to the suspicion of her fidelity is relatively weak or hardly existent, that the accused after having attacked the deceased made no secret of what he had done and that such conduct is not unusual. The learned state public prosecutor submitted that the presence of P. W. 2 can hardly be doubted and that the learned trial judge ought not to have disbelieved his version only because he had not in his original statement to the police included the extrajudicial confession. The submission is that considerable allowance will have to be made for the capacities of a rustic villager and if the court is satisfied that he is neither motivated nor dishonest, that the evidence will have to be acted upon. On the other hand, learned Advocate Sri chouta was quick to point out to the court that it is not a question of adopting a liberal approach while assessing the evidence but it is really an issue as to whether P. W. 2 has improved to the extent of fabricating on a very material aspect of the case. He submits and perhaps justifiably so, that if the accused had openly boasted about having murdered his wife that this would have been at the forefront of his statement to the police but the investigating officer has in his evidence established that P. W. 2 has not mentioned anything of this sort. It was submitted before us that the non-mention is not merely a question of an error but that it is a very definite indication of the fact that P. W. 2 has been instigated for whatever reason to seriously implicate the accused by connecting him with the murder through this statement. The principles of criminal jurisprudence are very well-defined and the law postulates that the non mention of very basic material aspects of the incident at the earliest point of time casts a very serious doubt on the credibility of the witness. The learned trial judge has therefore very correctly refrained from acting on this evidence by applying the aforesaid principle.

(3.) WE are then left with the evidence of P. W. 1-mudlegowda. According to this witness one kenipanna came running to him and informed him about the incident, that he immediately rushed there and saw the dead body of rangamma with multiple injuries and that the accused was standing there with the machu in his hand. According to him one sanjeeva reddy snatched the weapon from the hand of the accused after which he and. P. w. 2 tied up the accused with a rope and detained him there until the police came. The learned state public prosecutor has placed very heavy reliance on this witness who again admittedly is an independent person who has virtually no conceivable reason to falsely implicate the accused. Also, what is pointed out is that if this evidence is accepted that several circumstances would immediately stand established insofar as the irresistible conclusion that would emerge could only be that the deceased had been assaulted by the accused who was still standing there with the bloodstained weapon and consequently, that he would be liable to be convicted for the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. Had the evidence of P. W. 1 been credible and good enough for total acceptance by the court there is no ground on which a conviction could not have been based on this material alone. What was further submitted by the learned state public prosecutor was that the chemical analysis report does indicate that the machu was stained with human blood even though the drops on the weapon were not big enough for analysis of the grouping and that therefore, it could not be established that this blood was. of the 'b' group which happens to be the group of the deceased. The presence of the human blood on the weapon and the non-explanation by the accused in his statement as to how human blood was found on the weapon which he was holding immediately after the incident had taken place according to the learned state public prosecutor is a conclusive circumstance of bis guilt. On the basis of the medical evidence which fits in with the assault by a weapon of this type the learned state public prosecutor, submitted that the order of acquittal is liable to be reversed and that the accused ought to be convicted.