STATE Vs. KUDLIGERE HANUMANTHAPPA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The State has notified the respondents in this appeal arising from an order of acquittal passed by the J.M.F.C., Dayangere in C.C. No. 4878 of 1988 on 19-9-1990, of its intention to challenge the acquittal of the said accused. The learned Magistrate had allowed the accused before him who were six in number to enter into a compromise with the complainant in the case at whose behest the Police of Jagalut had occasion to investigate into complaint filed by him pursuant to which a charge-sheet listing indeed the commission of large number of offences by these accused punishable under Sections 143, 147, 341, 323, 354, 355, 448, 504, 506 r/ w 149, IPC and S. 7(3) of the Protection of Civil Rights Act, had been filed. But before trial could commence the accused were permitted by the Court to compound all the offences allegedly committed by them and in consequence they stood absolved of all the charges. TheState has challenged their acquittal as aforesaid.

(2.) Amongst other things, it is pointed out the offence under S. 7(3) of the P. C. R. Act was not compoundable at all because the Protection of Civil Rights Act did not permit composition of any offences cited under Section 7 thereof. Besides it is urged the provision under Section 320 of the Cr. P.C. which permits composition of certain offences enumerated under the schedule thereto with or without the permission Court would not in any event enable the accused to have compounded the offence under Section 7(3) of the P.C.R. Act, since that was not one of the offences enumerated in the schedule to Section 320, Cr.P.C. as compoundable voluntarily or with the permission of the Court. We notice from the catena of charges levelled against the accused, some of the other offences complained of namely offences enumerated under Sections 143, 147 and 149 are also not compoundable under Section 320, Cr.P.C. even with the permission of the Court much less without such permission.

(3.) All the accused were notified regards admission and are represented in this Court .by counsel. Their learned counsel maintain in that behalf that offences under Sections 143, 147 and 149 could be compoundable with the permission of the Court. He says some Courts have taken the aforesaid view. We do not wish to go into that controversy and suffice it to notice that in any event the offence made punishable under Section 7(3) of the Civil Rights Act is per se not compoundable even, with the permission of the Court for the simple reason neither the Protection of Civil Rights Act nor Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. makes the offence under Section 7(3)(d) of the aforesaid Act compoundable either with or without the permission of the Court. In the circumstances, the permission granted to the accused to compound even the offence under Section 7(3)(d) of the Act is without jurisdiction and clearly without competence. Learned Magistrate who was not oblivious to this difficulty, however, took assistance from a decision of the Madras High Court in Dhanraj v. State 1986 Cri LJ 284. In that case a learned single Judge of the Madras High Court appears to have taken the view that parties prescribed under Section 7 of the Protection of Civil Rights Act could be permitted to compound the said offence voluntarily. The headnote to the decision sets out the dicta that: