(1.) THE appellant has called in question THE power of THE respondent - market committee, to levy market fee on THE sale of rice manufactured from out of THE paddy purchased by him within THE market area or from oTHEr dealers who get THE paddy hulled in THE appellant's rice mill. The point urged before us is that under Section 65 of THE Karnataka agricultural produce marketing (regulation) Act, 1966 ('THE act' for short), it is not permissible to levy such market fee on THE same commodity twice, one at THE stage of paddy and later at THE stage of rice which amounts to multipoint levy and THErefore it will be against Section 65 of THE act. In support of THE contention, reliance has been placed on THE decision in THE case of ram chandra kailash kumar and co. V state of U.P., AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1124. It is also urged that though this ruling came to be considered later by THE Supreme Court in THE case of Sreenivasa general traders v State of a.p., AIR 1983 Supreme Court 1246, THE question came up directly in THE earlier ruling while in THE latter ruling Rule 74 of THE market committee rules alone came up for consideration. Hence when THE larger bench in AIR 1980 SC 1124 has taken a view in favour of THE appellant, that should prevail, and THErefore THE learned single judge was not right in rejecting THE same. In order to appreciate this point, we will quote THE relevant portion from AIR 1980 SC 1124. At page 1134, para 13, it was held thus: it is also not correct to say that THE agricultural produce must have been produced in THE market area in which THE first levy is made. It might have been produced in anoTHEr market area or even outside THE state of Uttar Pradesh but if a transaction of sale and purchase takes place of an agricultural produce as defined in THE act and covered by THE notification within a par ticular market area THEn fee can be charged in relation to THE said transaction. However, this case came up for consideration in THE latter ruling, viz., Air 1983 SC 1246, wherein it was held as follows:
(2.) AFTER we dismissed the writ appeal, an oral application was made before us for grant of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Inasmuch as we have merely followed the ruling of the Supreme Court which is concluded on the issue, we decline to grant leave.