H KRISHNAMURTHY Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner Sri H. Krishnamurthy joined service on the 2nd of June 1956 as Junior Assistant in the former State of Mysore. Thereafter on the 15th February I960 he came to be directly recruited as Assistant in the Karnataka Government Secretariat. By order dated 20th March 1975 Ex-'A' the petitioner was promoted on the officiating basis. The said order in express terms stipulates that his promotion is on officiating basis for a period of one year and that at the end of the period of officiation, his suitability to hold the post of Senior Assistant will be considered in accordance with Rule 18 (c) of the Karnataka State Civil Services (General Recruitment) Rules, 1957. On the 10th of August 1976, the State Government made an order as per Ex.-'B' extending the period of officiation of the petitioner for one more year with effect from 21-3-1976. The order states that after completion of the original period of officiation of one year, the suitability of the petitioner to hold the post of Senior Assistant was examined and if was found that his work during the period of officiation has not been wholly satisfactory and that therefore, it is considered necessary to extend his period of officiation. The period of officiation extended by Ext 'B' expired on the 21st March 1977. No order was made either reverting the petitioner or declaring that the petitioner has satisfactorily completed the period of officiation at the end of the extended period of officiation. The petitioner continued to serve as Senior Assistant until the impugned order came to be made on the 5th of July 1978 as per Ext.- 'C' reverting the petitioner to the post of Assistant, the post which he held prior to his promotion. It is the said order of reversion that is challenged by the petitioner in this writ petition.

(2.) Sri Murlidhar Rao, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that what governs this case is the Karnataka Civil Services (General Recruitment) Rules 1977, which have replaced the Karnataka Civil Services (General Recruitment) Rules, 1957. He submitted that the relevant provisions which require consideration and which apply to the facts of the present case are substantially the same under the 1957 Rules as also under the 1977 Rules. I shall, therefore, proceed to refer to the 1977 Rules.

(3.) Sri Murlidhar Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner could not have been reverted to the post of Assistant long after the period of officiation expired. It is clear from Rule 19 (3)(a) that all appointments by promotion shall be on officiation basis for a period of one year which may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, be extended by the appointing authority by a period not exceeding one year. It is having regard to this provision that in the original order of promotion of the petitioner Ext.-'A' it is stated that the petitioner has been promoted on an officiating basis fixing the period of officiation as one year. The said period was extended by Ext.-'B' dated 10th August 1976, by another one year from 21-3-19, 6. Clause (a) of sub-rule (3) of Rule 19 makes it clear that no further extension of the period of officiation was permissible. Clause (b) of sub-rule (3) of Rule 19 provides that at the end of the period of officiation or the reduced or extended period of officiation, as the case may be, the appointing authority shall consider the suitability of the person so promoted to hold the post to which he was promoted. Clause (c) of sub-rule (3) of Rule 19 provides that if the appointing authority considers that the work of the person so promoted during the period of officiation or the reduced or extended period of officiation is satisfactory, it shall, as soon as possible, issue an order declaring the person to have satisfactorily completed the period of officiation. Such an order shall have effect from the date of the expiry of the period of officiation, or the reduced or extended period of officiation, as the case may be. Clause (d) of sub-rule (3) however, provides that if at the end of the period of officiation or the extended period of officiation under clause (a), as the case may be, the appointing authority considers hat the person is not suitable for the post to which he is promoted it shall, by order revert the person to the post which he held prior to his promotion. Clause (e) of sub-rule (3) of Rule 19 provides that a person shall not be considered to have satisfactorily completed the period of officiation, unless a specific order to that effect is passed. Any delay in the issue of an order under clause (c) or clause (d) of this sub-rule, shall not entitle the person to be deemed to have satisfactorily completed the period of officiation. It is clear from these provisions that a person who has been promoted on officiating basis if he is continued in the promotional post after the expiry of the period of officiation, shall not be deemed to have satisfactorily completed the period of officiation if the appointing .authority has failed to make a declaration at the end of the period of officiation. Sri Murlidhar Rao contended that the power of reverting a person promoted on an officiating basis, can be exercised under Rule 19 (3) (d) only in respect of an official who, on the date of making such an order, was holding the post on an officiating basis and not otherwise. He also contended that the power under Rule 19 (3) (d) has to be exercised within a reasonably short period after the expiry of the period of officiation and not after the lapse of considerable time. It is no doubt true that Clause (a) of sub-rule (3) of Rule 19 limits the maximum period of officiation to two years. It is on that basis that Sri Murlidhar Rao contends that continuance of the petitioner after the expiry of two years from the date of his promotion on officiating basis cannot be regarded as his continuance on officiating basis. He submits that whatever may be the nature of continuance of the petitioner in office, the said continuance be regarded as continuance on officiating basis, as such continuance would be clearly contrary to the provisions of Rule 19(3) (a) of the Rules. It is necessary to point out that Rule 19 does not in express terms speak about the status of an official who has continued in service after the expiry of the total period of officiation of two years, the appointing authority not having passed an order either reverting the petitioner to the lower post or declaring that he has satisfactorily completed the period of officiation. One thing that clearly flows from clause (e) of sub-rule (3) of Rule 19 is that such a person cannot claim that he should be deemed to have satisfactorily completed the period of officiation. If the petitioner cannot be regarded as a person, who has satisfactorily completed the period of officiation and the maximum period of officiation permissible under Rule 19 (3) (a) has expired, the question for consideration is as to whether the power of reversion under clause (d) of sub-rule (3) of Rule 19 can be exercised. Merely because the power of extending the period of officiation is limited to a period of two years by clause (a) of sub-rule (3) of Rule 19, is it possible to take the view that the appointing authority does not have the power of reverting the person who has continued in office after the expiry of the period of officiation.