GOWRAMMA, D/O ANJANAPPA, BANGALORE Vs. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, NATIONAL HIGHWAY AND COMPETENT AUTHORITY FOR LAND ACQUISITION, (KM 30-75) K.R. CIRCLE, BANGALORE AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner has called into question the order, date 26.5.2011 (Annexure -F) passed on I.A. No. 2 by the Court of the Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Nelamangala in LAC No. 5/09 allowing the impleadment of the respondent Nos. 3 to 5.

(2.) THE facts of the case in brief are that the land measuring 37 guntas out of total extent of 6 acres 23 guntas standing at Survey No. 73 of Sompura Village was acquired for the purpose of National Highways. The claims for compensation amount are advanced by the petitioner and the respondent Nos. 3 to 5. The respondent Nos. 3 and 4 had filed W.P. No. 21039/2000 and obtained an interim order on 7.7.2000 restraining the respondent No. 1 from disbursing the compensation amount to the petitioner and one Bharath R. Gajaria. On 7.9.2001 the petition was withdrawn with the liberty to pursue the remedies under Section 11 and 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, When the respondent No. 1 disbursed a sum of about Rs. 1,42,500/ - the respondent Nos. 3 to 5 filed W.P. No. 30639/2002. this Court, by its order, dated 28.1.2004 rejected the petition with the liberty to the petitioners to approach the Civil Court, as serious questions of title are involved. The respondent No. 1 presented the reference to the Civil Court invoking Section 3H (4) of the National Highways Act, 1956.

(3.) SRI B.M. Halaswamy, the Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the third parties cannot seek the impleadment in the reference proceedings. The reference sent is regarding the compensation in respect of some structure and that too between different parties. He submits that the scope of enquiry cannot be enlarged. It has to be strictly within the parameters of reference sent. He relies on the Apex Court's judgement in the case of Prayag Upnivesh Awas Evam Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. Vs. Allahabad Vikas Pradhikaran and Another, AIR 2003 SC 2302 , wherain it is held chat a Reference Court has no jurisdiction to decide a matter which is not referred to it. As the reference sent is not in respect of the dispute between the petitioner and the respondent Nos. 3 to 5, they cannot be permitted to be arraigned as the parties in the LAC proceedings to resist the claims of the petitioner. He read out paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the said decision. The said paragraphs are extracted hereinbelow: 7. It is well established that the Reference Court gets jurisdiction only if the matter is referred to it under Section 18 or 30 of the Act by the Land Acquisition Officer and that the civil court has got the jurisdiction and authority only to decide the objections referred to it The Reference Court cannot widen the scope of its jurisdiction or decide matters which are not referred to it This question was considered by various judicial authorities and one of the earliest decisions reported on this point is Pramatha Nath Mullick Bahadur v. Secy. of State. This was a case where the claimant sought a reference under Section 18 of the Act. In the application filed by the claimant, he raised objection only regarding the valuation of the land. The claimant did not dispute the measurements of the land given in the award. Before the Reference Court, the claimant raised objection regarding the measurements of the land and sought for the fresh measurements. This was refused and the claimant applied to the High Court for revision of this order, but without success. Again, in the appeal, the claimant raised the same objection regarding measurements and the High Court rejected it. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held thus: (AIR p. 65). Their Lordships have do doubt that the jurisdiction of the courts under this Act is a special one and is strictly limited by the terms of these sections. It only arises when a specific objection has been taken to the Collector's award, and it is confined to a consideration of that objection. Once therefore it is ascertained that the only objection taken is to the amount of compensation, that alone is the 'matter' referred, and the court has no power to determine or consider anything beyond it. 8. In another case, namely, Mohd. Hasnuddin v. State of Maharashtra, this Court observed : (SCC p. 584, para 25) 25. Every tribunal of limited jurisdiction is not only entitled but bound to determine whether the matter in which it is asked to exercise its jurisdiction comes within the limits of its special jurisdiction and whether the jurisdiction of such tribunal is dependent on the existence of certain facts or circumstances. Its obvious duty is to see that these facts and circumstances exist to invest it with jurisdiction, and where a tribunal derives its jurisdiction from the statute that creates it and that statute also defines the conditions under which the tribunal can function, it goes without saying that before that tribunal assumes jurisdiction in a matter, it must be satisfied that the conditions requisite for its acquiring seisin of that matter have in fact arisen. As observed by the Privy Council in Nusserwanjee Pestonjee v. Meer Mynoodeen Khan wherever jurisdiction is given to a court by an Act of Parliament and such jurisdiction is only given upon certain specified terms contained in that Act, it is a universal principle that these terms must be complied with, in order to create and raise the jurisdiction for if they be not complied with the jurisdiction does not arise. 9. In K. Kankarathanamma and Ors. v. State of A.P., the Land Acquisition Officer made a reference under Section 30 for the apportionment of the compensation amount amongst the various claimants. Six of the appellants did not accept the award of the Land Acquisition Officer and made application to him for referring the matter for determination by the court, but no reference was made by him pursuant to this application. When the matter came up before the court, it proceeded on the footing that the reference made to it was not merely limited to the apportionment of compensation but also with respect to the amount of compensation. No objection, however, was raised by the State before the reference court regarding the absence of reference. When the matter came up before the High Court, the Govt. Pleader raised this objection. Though the High Court allowed the plea to be raised before it, but ultimately it negatived the plea. The appellants contended before the High Court that pursuant to the failure of the State to raise the plea before the Subordinate Judge as to the absence of a reference, the State must be deemed to have waived the point Rejection this contention, this Court held: (AIR p.306, para 3) The matter goes to the court only upon a reference made by the Collector It is only after such a reference is made that the court is empowered to determine the objections made by a claimant to the award. Section 21 restricts the scope of the proceedings before the court to consideration of the contentions of the persons affected by the objection. These provisions thus leave no doubt that the jurisdiction of the court arises solely on the basis of a reference made to it. No doubt, the Land Acquisition Officer has made a reference under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act but that reference was only in regard to the apportionment of the compensation amongst the various claimants. Such a reference would certainly not invest the court with the jurisdiction to consider a matter not directly connected with it This is realty not a mere technicality for as pointed out by the Privy Council in Nusserwanjee Pestonjee v. Meer Mynoodeen Khan wherever jurisdiction is given by a statute and such jurisdiction is only given upon certain specified terms contained therein it is a universal principle that those terms should be complied with, in order to create and raise the jurisdiction, and if they are not complied with the jurisdiction does not arise. This was, therefore, a case of lack of inherent jurisdiction and the failure of the State to object to the proceedings before the court on the ground of an absence of reference insofar as the determination of compensation was concerned cannot amount to waiver or acquiescence. Indeed, when there is an absence of inherent jurisdiction, the defect cannot be waived nor can be cured by acquiescence.