LAWS(KAR)-2011-11-173

VASUDHA RAMABHADRAN, DAUGHTER OF LATE N.RAMBHADRAN Vs. SYNDICATE BANK HEAD OFFICE, BY CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR, MANIPAL-576 119

Decided On November 21, 2011
Vasudha Ramabhadran, Daughter Of Late N.Rambhadran Appellant
V/S
Syndicate Bank Head Office, By Chairman And Managing Director, Manipal -576 119 Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) HEARD the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondent. The brief facts of the case are as follows: The petitioner was a Practicing Advocate who had obtained a Bachelor of Law Degree in the year 1967. The respondent - Bank had invited applications from eligible candidates for the post of Law Officer, in the Bank. The notification in this regard is at Annexure -"A" to the writ petition It was indicated that the maximum age prescribed for the post was 35 years and had also prescribed a minimum of seven years practice as a lawyer. The petitioner was found duly qualified and was appointed by an order dated 26.09.1978, in terms of Annexure -"C" to the writ petition, as a Law Officer in the Senior grade of the Officers' cadre. The petitioner's period of probation was declared satisfactorily as on 14.11.1979 and she was confirmed in the permanent service of the Bank in the Senior Officers' grade. She was promoted from time to time and retired from service as Assistant General Manager, (Law), on 31.01.2003. Her pension was settled in terms of Annexure -"E". However, the Qualifying service taken into account was only 24 years from the date of confirmation i.e. from 6.10.1979 to the date of retirement. It is this which is the grievance of the petitioner. According to the petitioner, the Bank had introduced a pension scheme for its employees namely the Syndicate Bank Employees Pension Regulations, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Regulations' for brevity), which was a scheme pursuant to a settlement signed by the Indian Banks Association with the Workmens Union / Officers Organisation on industrial level on 29.10.1993. The scheme, inter alia, provided for an option to the existing employees who were on the rolls as on 1.11.1993 to exercise their options thereunder namely employees joining the Bank or who had joined the Bank on or after 1.11.1993, who were eligible only for pension value contributory provident fund and were covered under the pension scheme automatically. It is pointed out that under Regulation 26 employees qualifying for superannuation pension, were eligible to add to his or her service the actual period not exceeding one fourth of the length of his service, or the actual period by which, his age at the time of recruitment exceeded the upper age limit specified by the Bank for direct recruitment, or a period of five years, whichever was less, if the service or post to which the employee was appointed is one which required post -graduate, research or specialist qualifications, or experience in scientific, technological or professional fields. When the petitioner applied to the Bank, the age of recruitment was increased to 35 years, due to the requirement of professional experience of a minimum 7 years, for the post of Law Officers. Therefore, it is the petitioner's case that she fulfilled the requirement of the 1995 Regulation 26 for addition of the qualifying service under that regulation and since she was denied the addition of qualifying service of a period of five years, the petitioner made a representation as per Annexure -"H".

(2.) THE respondent issued an endorsement at Annexure -"J" rejecting the claim of the petitioner on the ground that the Government of India, on a pointed query raised by the respondent, had clarified that the employees such as the petitioner would not be entitled for any such claim, on the footing that the Regulation is to be applied only for future recruitment and not for existing employees. This the learned counsel for the petitioner would submit is not tenable since in terms of the Regulations itself, it is clear that it would apply to all employees who were in service of the Bank as on 1.11.1993 and the addition of qualifying service would make it clear that it would apply to all employees who were in service and not only to employees recruited in future alone. It is in this background that the petitioner is before this Court.

(3.) THE learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand, would vehemently contest the petition and in support of the Statement of objections filed would contend that the appointment order, on the face of it, does not refer to the petitioner as a 'Specialist Officer' within the meaning of Regulation No.26. It is the petitioner's own interpretation as to "Law Officers" being Specialist Officers and the writ petition is not supported by any document to indicate that the appointment order can be construed as indicating that the petitioner is a Specialist Officer. That notwithstanding, the reference to Piliai Committee Report which is produced before the Court subsequent to completion of the pleadings, the same would not advance the case of the petitioner since the petitioner cannot deny that he was placed in the general stream of Bank employees and was not considered as a Specialist Officer as was the case of officers such as Chartered Accountants, Economists, etc., who continue in the same position throughout their service tenure and therefore, could be safely treated as specialists. The petitioner though appointed as a Law Officer, she was not continued in the same capacity and the petitioner has been appointed as an Assistant General Manager in charge of a branch also during her tenure and therefore, the petitioner cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be considered as a Specialist Officer by reference to the Pillai Committee report. It is only an assumption on the part of the petitioner that she was appointed as a Specialist Officer and therefore, the petitioner being denied the additional qualifying service, is in order. The learned counsel would submit that an unfair contention has been taken that the direction issued by this Court in the earlier writ petition has not been complied with. On the other hand, every single contention of the petitioner has been addressed, in that, the Service Regulations did not provide for appointment of a Specialist Officer and as such, the petitioner was not appointed as a Specialist Officer, This is evident from the appointment order. In the absence of Recruitment Rules, the order of appointment and the order of confirmation clearly indicates that the petitioner was appointed only as an Officer in the Bank and was fit into the category of the Officer of the Bank as per recommendations of the said Pillai committee report. The Pension Regulations came into effect from 29.09.1995 and were not in force as on date the petitioner was appointed. Having regard to the law laid down by this Court in the case of B. Vittal Pai Vs. Syndicate Bank, Manipal, ILR (2000) KAR 306 , to the effect that the provisos to Regulation 26 of the Pension Regulations, are retrospective in nature. The petitioner is not in a position to draw sustenance from the same and since the second proviso to Regulation 26 spells out that unless the benefit contemplated under the Regulation 26 is conferred on the employee under the Regulations itself, the question of the employee seeking the benefit of the same does not arise. As the petitioner was not given the benefit of appointment as a Specialist Officer, the petitioner was not treated as a Specialist Officer. In the first instance, the question of adding five years of additional qualifying service by virtue of Regulation 26 would not arise and in the absence of any such Regulation conferring the benefit on the petitioner, the same cannot be pressed into service. Further, it is only if the Recruitment Rules duly framed and approved by the Central Government providing for such benefit, that the same can be claimed by the petitioner. In the absence of any Recruitment Rules as on date, the petitioner placing reliance on the appointment order which does not indicate that he was a specialist officer, would not afford the petitioner to claim such status and claim additional qualifying service. It is in this vein that the learned counsel for the respondent would seek to deny the benefit to the petitioner.