LAWS(KAR)-2011-12-290

K. SHASHIDHAR Vs. THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, BANGALORE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY COMPANY (BESCOM), K.R. CIRCLE, BANGALORE -560001 AND THE SUPERINTENDENT ENGINEER, (ELECL) (COMMERCIAL, OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE) BANGALORE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY COMPANY NRUPATUN

Decided On December 09, 2011
K. Shashidhar Appellant
V/S
Managing Director, Bangalore Electricity Supply Company (Bescom), K.R. Circle, Bangalore -560001 And The Superintendent Engineer, (Elecl) (Commercial, Operation And Maintenance) Bangalore Electricity Supply Company Nrupatun Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) HEARD the learned counsel for the petitioner and the counsel for the respondents. The facts briefly stated are as follows: The petitioner had joined the respondents as an Assistant in the year 1984. When he was working as an Assistant with C -3 Sub -Division, Mathikere and was so discharging his duties, disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner as well as three others working in the same division were initiated under Regulation 11 of the Karnataka Electricity Board Employees' (Classification, Disciplinary, Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the '1987 Regulations' for brevity), and charge -sheet was issued. The sum and substance of the charge -sheet was, that the petitioner and two others had committed theft of monies belonging to the Board as on 4.11.1998. The petitioner had submitted his reply to the same, denying the charges, the respondents proceeded to initiate proceedings under Regulation 14 -A of the 1987 Regulations and on the basis of a report of the Vigilance Commission, proceeded to terminate the services of the petitioner. The petitioner challenged the order of termination before this Court by way of a writ petition in W.P. No. 3844/1999 which was partly allowed, by an order dated 9.8.1999, allowing the present petitioner's writ petition as well as other writ petitions, filed by other employees, questioning their orders of dismissal passed against them as well. The Board, however, was granted opportunity to initiate a fresh enquiry as contemplated under the 1987 Regulations. The Board had thereafter passed a resolution under Regulation 11 and passed an order of dismissal based on the very report submitted in the first instance. That was challenged in appeal before the Appellate Authority and the appeal having been rejected by a judgment dated 26.12.2001/ the petitioner then raised an industrial dispute before the Labour Court under Section 10 -4(A) of the Industrial Disputes (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 1987. The same was contested and the Labour Court rejected the dispute on the ground of limitation. in the meanwhile, independent criminal proceedings which had been initiated against the petitioner by the Jurisdictional police who had filed a charge -sheet before the Court of the First Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore, had proceeded further and by a judgment dated 6.8.2003, the Court of the First Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate had acquitted the petitioner on the benefit of doubt. The petitioner thereafter had questioned the dismissal of the dispute before this Court in writ petition in W.P. No. 12031/2006. This Court held that the respondents could not have dismissed the petitioner from service merely on the basis, of the investigation report which was submitted when the petitioner was acquitted in the criminal proceedings and in the absence of any evidence in support of the investigation report by holding a further domestic enquiry which was available under sub -regulation 1 (a) of Regulation 14 -A of the 1987 Regulations. The same was questioned by way of a writ appeal before the Division Bench of this Court and the order of the learned Single Judge having been affirmed by the judgment of the Division Bench, the same was carried before the Apex Court and the matter attained finality in the Apex Court dismissing the Special Leave Petition filed by the respondents. In none of the proceedings, either before the High Court or the Apex Court, did the respondents seek leave of the Court to conduct any fresh enquiry. However, on the order of dismissal, having been successfully challenged by the petitioner, having attained finality, the respondents have now chosen to resort to the disciplinary enquiry in terms of the Regulations on the footing that notwithstanding the special procedure that was adopted in the first instance, the respondents are not precluded from initiating fresh proceedings which was always available to the respondents. It is this which is under challenge in the present petition. Therefore, the point for consideration before this Court in this petition is whether there is a bar to such proceedings by virtue of the earlier procedure adopted under Regulation 14 -A having culminated in a final order before the Supreme Court, and whether the respondent would be in a position to initiate fresh proceedings by resorting to the general procedure of holding disciplinary proceedings against its employees.

(2.) REGULATION 14 -A reads as follows:

(3.) THE learned counsel for the respondents, however, would seek to place reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the ease of Mehiboobsab Vs. Upalokayukta and Others, ILR (2002) KAR 2535 , which was a case where on an acquittal in a criminal proceeding whether the right of the employer to initiate or continue departmental proceedings against the employee in regard to the same charges, was available. This Court had pointed out that whether the employee is honourably acquitted by being completely exonerated, then, normally it would not be expedient to continue Departmental enquiry on the same charges as held in G.M. Tank Vs. State of Gujarat and Another, AIR 2006 SC 2129 , and while distinguishing the judgment in Capt. M. Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and Anr., AIR 1999 SC 1416 , the same is not the circumstances in the present case on hand. The special procedure that was adopted by recourse to Regulation 14 -A preclude the respondents from initiating fresh proceedings in terms of the Regulations providing for disciplinary proceedings under Part -V and Part -VI of the Regulations. The choice of either folding an enquiry or not to hold an enquiry pursuant to the Investigatory report, was certainty available to the respondents which it did not choose to press into service either in the first instance or on a remand by this Court while allowing the writ petition filed by the petitioner herein in W.P. No. 3844/1999. In that view of the matter, the respondents are certainly precluded from holding any fresh proceedings in respect of the very charge that was the subject matter of the earlier proceedings.