R KUMARASWAMY Vs. CHANNAMMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The writ petition is referred to division Bench pursuant to the order passed by the learned single Judge dated 14.11.2002 under Section 9 of the Karnataka High Court Act. The learned single Judge was of the view that once the conditions of grant are satisfied as per the relevant Rules which were in force as on the date of grant, the land ceases to be a granted land and therefore, if the said land was purchased subsequent to coming into force of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978, (for short, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), Section 4(2) of the said Act has no application. But however, the learned single Judge had some doubt with regard to the decision in the case of Eranna v. Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga District, 2001 ILR(Kar) 3136. Under these circumstances, the matter is placed before us. Indeed we notice that the entire writ petition is referred for the decision of this Court.

(2.) The facts relevant for the purpose of disposal of this writ petition can be briefly stated as follows:

(3.) In support of the writ petition Mr. Angadi, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner submits that the Petitioner being the third purchaser in the year 1997 and the sale having taken place after 15 years from the date of grant, the question of the Act becoming applicable would not arise, inasmuch as according to him the sale has taken place after the stipulated period as mentioned in the Grant Certificate. The other contention raised by him is that the first sale took place in the year 1987, that is once again after the stipulated period mentioned in the Grant Certificate. When the sale itself has taken place after the stipulated period, the question of the first Respondent claiming restoration of the land would not arise. Thus, according to him, the sale is valid. Another contention raised by him is as the first sale having taken place on 7.5.1987, the Petitioner has perfected his title by adverse possession, inasmuch as notwithstanding the fact that the non-alienation clause having commenced in the year 1987 during the pendency of the proceedings, the stipulated period having been completed.