PUTHU Vs. ABUBAKKAR ALIAS CHAYYA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner is directed to implead the State. S. P. P. takes notice.

(2.) THE revision filed under Section 397, Cr. P. C. for setting aside the orders of the J. M. F. C. , Puttur in C. C. No. 2000/2000. The petitioner is one of the accused facing trial for committing offences punishable under Sections 326, 342, 343, 346, 347, 352, 357, 365 and 367 read with Section 34 of the I. P. C. The case was instituted on a private complaint. The Magistrate took cognizance, recorded the sworn statement and on being satisfied with the material, issued process. The petitioner and other accused appeared before the Court. The first petitioner herein is the complainant. The second petitioner is the accused No. 1. The first petitioner made an application for withdrawal of the complaint under Section 257, Cr. P. C. The learned Magistrate, after considering the relevant provisions of law, has rightly held that the provisions of Section 257, Cr. P. C. , do not apply to the case in question since it is a warrant trial. The provisions of Sec. 257, Cr. P. C. , apply only to summons procedure. Evidently, the offences mentioned are cognizable offences and some of them are compoundable and some non-compoundable. Part B of Chapter XIX of Cr. P. C. deals with the procedure to be followed for warrant trials instituted otherwise than on police report. Under Section 249, Cr. P. C. in the said Chapter, it is in the discretion of the Magistrate to dismiss the complaint and discharge the accused when the charge in the case is yet to be framed and when the offences mentioned are compoundable and are non-cognizable. None of the material pre-requisites under Section 249, Cr. P. C. apply to the facts herein. Therefore, if the offence is a cognizable one or a non-compoundable one, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to dismiss the complaint after framing of the charge. In such a situation, the logical corollory would be to direct the State to proceed with the prosecution. Even in cases where the offence is non-compoundable or cognizable after cognizance is taken and the complaint remains indifferent or remains absent, the Magistrate has to direct the State to proceed with the case. The scheme of the provisions of the Cr. P. C. appears to make out clear distinction between summons trial and warrant trial with significant purpose. The cases normally tried by summons procedure are misdemeanours. Therefore, lenient view is taken bylaw. In the case of offences covered by warrant trials are heinous offences. Any offence committed is not only an offence against the victim in the eye of law but the offence is construed as an offence against the public at large and an offence against the State. With the given philosophy of the law, the framers of the Code did not provide for any such liberal dismissal or discharge to be made for the accused facing a trial by warrant procedure. In that view of the matter, the order passed by the trial Court in rejecting the request of the complainant to withdraw the complaint under Section 257, Cr. P. C. cannot be considered as illegal rather it is a correct and a justified order in law.

(3.) THE counsel for the petitioners submitted that in so far as the offences which are compoundable under Section 320, Cr. P. C. , the Magistrate could have accorded permission to compound the offence. However, no request in that behalf was made before the trial Court to grant the relief, for the first time such a request is made in the arguments. If at all the parties are interested in compounding the offences which are compoundable in law, they are at liberty to make proper application before the trial Court. Under the circumstances, the impugned order does not call for any interference. Accordingly the petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.