(1.) These are cases coming before us by an order of reference made by a Division Bench of this Court in these Writ Petitions. Two points are referred to us:
(2.) The matter came before the Division Bench itself in view of the conflicting opinion rendered in two cases. In SAYYAD KALEEL AHMED v. STATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE TRIBUNAL W.Ps. 352 & 474 of 1981 a Division Bench was of the view that the permit granted cannot be set aside on the ground a draft scheme under Section 68C has been published which covered the route. The contrary view in AMEER PASHA v. K.S.T.A.T W.P. 5101 of 1979 DD 2-7-1982. was to the effect that though a permit had been granted prior to the promulgation of the scheme, the permit was liable to be set aside by the Appellate Authority, if the draft scheme under Section 68C was published subsequent to the grant either before or after the filing of the appeal. In this case, arguments have been advanced before us stating all these schemes forming the subject-matter of the Writ Petitions, came to be issued under Section 68C of the Old Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 on 16-6-1968 and 3-3-1988 viz., Chitradurga scheme, Mysore scheme and Kolar schemes respectively. Therefore, it is argued, the Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 having come into force on 1-7-1983, these schemes lapsed by reason of Section 100(4) of 1983 Act. Therefore, the setting aside of the permit because of existence of Section 68C promulgated under 1939 Act, as a result of which the Appellate Authorities took the view as was stated in these cases, whether valid or not, need not be gone into. The matters may be remitted to the Tribunal for fresh consideration in the light of the lapsing of the scheme and in the light of the provisions of the 1988 Act. These, in short, are the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners.
(3.) In opposition to this, the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation submits that it is incorrect to state that the schemes had lapsed. On the contrary, if one looks at the repealing provision under Section 217, it would clearly go to show that Section 100(4), by reason, of Section 217(2)(e), would be applicable only to the procedure in so far as it talks of disposal of not determination of the scheme. Therefore, the substantive provision of lapse would not be covered by Section 217(2)(e). The result will be schemes promulgated under 1939 Act could continue subject to the limitation of 3 years or 5 years as the case may be as decided by the Supreme Court in ONKARSINGH AND ORS. v. REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, AGRA AND ORS. and K.T. DHARANENDRAH v. REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY AND ORS.