T RAMADASAPPA Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner who is the Chairman of the Karnataka Slum Clearance Board appointed under the Notification No. HUD 159 MCS 78, 14th June, 1978, has in this petition, under Art. 226 of the Constitution, sought for a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent not to terminate the petitioner from the post of Chairmanship of the Board till the expiry of the term and also for a writ in the nature of prohibition, prohibiting the respondent from taking any proceeding to remove the petitioner from the office of the Chairman of the Karnataka Slum Clearance Board, Bangalore.

(2.) Sri S. K. Venkataranga lyengar, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the appointment of the petitioner having been made under S. 34(2} and (3) of the Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), an indefeasible right is created in him to remain in the office till the expiry of the term. Therefore until the term expires, the respondent cannot precipitate the matter and cannot take action to remove the petitioner without affording an opportunity to him. The learned Counsel also placed reliance on S. 36 of the Act. Sections 34 and 36 of the Act are as follows: S. 34 Constitution of the Boards: (1) -The Board shall consist of a Chairman and such number of other official and non-official members not exceeding fifteen as may be prescribed. (2) The Chairman and other members of the Board shall be appointed by the Government and shall hold office during the pleasure of the Government. (3) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) the term of office of the Chairman and other members shall be for a period of threeyears. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Section the Chairmen and other members of the Board shall continue in office after the expiry of their term till their successors are appointed under this Section. S. 36: Conditions of Service of Chairman and other members-The conditions of service of the Chairman and other members shall be such as may be prescribed. Sub-sec. (2) of S. 34 of the Act makes it clear that the Chairman and other members of the Board shall hold the office during the pleasure of the Government. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim the office as of right as against the Government or at any rate cannot claim that there is an indefeasible right created by reason of his appointment as the Chairman of the Board. The learned counsel also submitted that the period of 3 years having been mentioned as the period of term of office of the Chairman under sub-section (3) of S. 34 of the Act, the Government cannot at its pleasure terminate the appointment of the petitioner as Chairman of the Board. But, it is of importance to note that the order appointing the petitioner as the Chairman of the Board (Ex-A), though stated to have been passed by the Government in exercise of the powers conferred by S. 34(2) (3) and (4) of the Act, it does not fix the term of office. The order specifically states that the appointment of the petitioner as Chairman of the Board is 'until further orders'. Though sub-sec. (3) of S. 34 of the Act provides that the term of office of the Chairman and other members of the Board shall be for a period of 3 years, still it is open for the Government to appoint the Chairman and other members of the Board for a shorter period. Sub-sec. (3) of S. 34 cannot be interpreted to mean that the Government cannot appoint the Chairman and other members of the Board for a period shorter than 3 years. The order appointing the petitioner though makes a reference to sub-sec. (3) of S. 34 of the Act, in view of the wordings contained in the order that the appointment is 'until further orders', it cannot be said that the petitioner has been appointed for a period of three years. In the instant case, it is not even necessary to consider whether the State Government can withdraw the pleasure at any time in the case of an appointment made for a period of three years, as in the instant case as already pointed out, the appointment itself is not for a specific period While considering the similar provisions contained in the Karnataka Improvement Boards Act 1976 a Bench of this Court, in Siddappa v. State of Karnataka, (1979) 2 Kar.L.J. 238. has held that the period prescribed does not give any security for the holder of the office and it is only a limitation imposed by the legislature on the Executive for appointing a person at pleasure.

(3.) Sri Venkatranga Iyengar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, placed reliance upon the decision of the High Court of Rajasthan in Jwala Prasad v. State, AIR 1973 Raj. 187. That was a case relating to the supersession of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, challenged by the Chairman of the Corporation, in which it has been held that the Chairman of the Corporation enjoyed certain pecuniary benefits, therefore, he was entitled to invoke the jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The learned counsel also relied upon two other decisions, reported in Durayappah v. Fernando, (1967) 2 All. E. R. 152 PC. & Re. Pergamon Press Ltd, (1970) SAIL E. R. 535 CA. These two decisions relate to applicability of and compliance with the principles of natural justice. All the three aforesaid decisions are of no assistance to the petitioner, as the said decisions do not touch upon the question involved in this writ petition as to whether the, reliefs prayed in the writ petition can be granted having regard to the provisions contained in Section 34 of the Act and the wordings contained in the order of appointment in question appointing the petitioner as Chairman of the Board until further orders. Therefore, I do not think it necessary to deal with the aforesaid cases in detail. In view of the interpretation as aforesaid placed on S. 34(2) and (3) of the Act, it will have to be held that the petitioner is not entitled for the reliefs as prayed in the writ petition.