(1.) The question in this case is whether the accused drove the vehicle in a public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life or to be likely to cause hurt or in-jury to any other person.
(2.) The facts which are not in dispute are these : On 5-3-1969 Bhimanna (P. W. 1) was driving his taxi bearing No. MYD 7866 from the side of Tumkur to Bangalore in the National High Way at about 11 p. m. When he came near the village called Peenva. which is close to Bangalore, he saw a lorry coming from the opposite direction. P., W. 1's evidence is that he slowed down the speed of his car because of the lorry corning from the opposite direction and shortly thereafter, the accused, who was driving the M. S. R. T. C. bus bearing No. M, Y. F. 6383 came from behind and dashed against the right rear portion of the car causing damage.
(3.) According to the, accused, when he was proceeding towards Bangalore and when he came near Peenya village, he saw the taxi in question standing in the road on the left side and as he came nearer the taxi. P. W. 1. who was in the taxi, suddenly reversed the vehicle. He applied the brakes and in fact stopped the bus, but due to the movement of the car backwards, there was a collision between them, as a result of which the right portion of the taxi hit against the left side of the bus. with the result some damage was caused to the taxi. In these circumstances he contended that he neither drove the vehicle in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person. The Courts below have accepted the version of P. W. 1 and convicted the accused. Apart from the evidence of P. W. 1, no other person has spoken to the rashness or negligence attributed to the accused. P. W. 1 could not have been in a position to see whether the accused was driving the vehicle rashly or negligently as he was seated in his car and was proceeding towards Bangalore. In using the highway, one is not bound to foresee every extremity of folly which occurs on the road; equally he is certainly not entitled to drive on the footing that other users of the road, either drivers or pedestrians, will exercise reasonable care. He is bound to anticipate any act which is reasonably foreseeable, that is to say any thing which the experience of road users teaches them that people do albeit negligently. If the version of P. W. 1 is accepted, the accused is liable because it was a foreseeable emergency and the accused should have anticipated the car being slowed down when the other vehicle was coming in the opposite direction.