K RAMACHANDRAYYA Vs. FIRST ADDL DISTRICT JUDGE BANGALORE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Petitioner filed Election Petition Ele. Misc. No.212 of 1969 before the Addl. Second Munsiff, Bangalore, challenging the election of the second respondent as a Taluk Development Board Member of the Anekal Taluk Development Board from thte Jigani Constituency. The election petition was allowed and the election oi the second respondent was set aside by the Addl. "Second Munsiff, Bangalore. He made a further declaration that the petitioner is elected a member of the Anekal Taluk Development Board from the Jigani Constituency. As against this decision, the second respondent filed Misc. App. No.22 of 1970 before the I Addl. District Judge, Bangalore, under the provisions of S.106(7) of the Mysore Village Panchayats and Local Boards Act, 1959 (hereinafter called the Act). The second respondent also made an application (IA.No.1) to stay the operation of the order dated 20th Jan. 1970 passed by the Addl. Second Munsiff, Bangalore, in Elc. Misc. App. No.212 of 1968, pending disposal of the above appeal. This application (IA.No.1) was allowed and the operation of the order of the Addl. Second Munsiff, Bangalore, was stayed pending disposal of the appeal. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner has preferred the above writ petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, praying that the impugned order of the first respondent-1 Addl. District Judge, Bangalore (Ext.F) be quashed.

(2.) Sri S. K. Venkataranga lyengar, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, has advanced arguments which are mainly two fold. The first is that the First Addl. District Judge, as an appellate authority, has no power to grant an order of stay of operation of the order passed by the Addl. Second Munsiff on an election petition filed under S.106(7) of the Act. The second contention is that even if it is held that the First Addl. District Judge, as an appellate authority, has power to grant an order of stay, his decision granting stay in this case is patently erroneous and liable to be set aside. The petitioner also made an application on 24-2-70 after this petition had become part-heard, seeking permission to raise an additional contention that the First Addl. District Judge who had passed the impugned order had no jurisdiction to hear the Election Appeal under S. 106 (7) of the Act as the District Jndge is only a persona designata who alone had to hear the appeal and it could not be transferred to the Addl. District Judge. This application was however not pressed and therefore we are not called upon to consider that application and it is rejected.

(3.) The petitioner's learned Counsel submitted that the powers of the Munsiff as an Election Tribunal is entirely circumscribed by the provisions of S.106 of the Act. Under the provisions of 3.106(2) of the Act, the Munsiff is invested with powers of a Civil Court only for the purpose of the enquiry. He is not invested with all the powers that a Civil Court has under the provisions of the CPC. Our attention was invited to a decision of this Court in WP. No. 50 of 1960 (1) and to the observation that the word 'Court' in S.231 includes a Munsiff hearing an election petition as persona designate. Though this decision was under S.13(1), it applies to the provisions of S.106 of the Act so far as the Munsiff is concerned. Reliance was also placed on the decision in Nagireddy v. Khandappa, 1961 Mys.L.J. Jr. 24. in support of the submission that the Munsiff acting as an Election Tribunal under the Act, is a persora designata. It was further submitted that the District Judge, as an appellate authority under S.106 (7) of the Act is also a persona designata and the word 'Court' in S.231 includes the District Judge also. It was therefore contended that the prohibition under Sec.231 of the Act applies to the District Judge also. S.231 of the Act reads -as follows: