YANKAPPA TIMMAPPA KOLACHI Vs. SHAVAKKA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The respondent sued the appellant, who is her husband, in Civil Suit No. 229 of 1954, in the Court of the joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Bagalkot, for a declaration that the divorce deed marked as Exhibit 23 in this case dated 26-8-1954 was obtained from her by the defendant by means of fraud and coercion. She has also asked for restitution of conjugal rights. Both the Courts below have concurrently come to the conclusion that the deed Ex. 23 was taken by means of fraud and coercion and as such the same is not valid. They also decreed the plaintiff's claim for restitution of conjugal rights. The correctness of these conclusions cannot be, and has not been, canvassed in this Court. The only point argued before this Court is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit in view of the provisions contained in Ss. 4, 9, 19 and 29(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act (Act XXV of 1955) which shall be hereinafter called the 'Act'.

(2.) The suit out of which this appeal arose was instituted on 28-8-1954. The 'Act' came into force on 18-5-1955. There is no dispute that on the date when the suit was instituted, it was properly instituted and that the learned Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Bagalkot had jurisdiction to try the same. The contention advanced on behalf of the appellant is that after the 'Act' came into force the learned Joint Civil Judge lost jurisdiction to try the suit and the plaint should have been returned for presentation to the proper Court. Is this contention correct? Admittedly there are no specific provision in the 'Act' which statutorily transfer a suit of this nature to the appropriate Court constituted under the 'Act'. Nor are there any provisions which specifically take away the jurisdiction that existed in the ordinary Civil Courts to try suits for restitution of conjugal rights. Hence we have to consider whether the jurisdiction of the ordinary Civil Courts was taken away by necessary implication.

(3.) It is now well settled that a statute realting to matters of procedure operates retrospectively, unless otherwise provided in the Statute. But this principle is not applicable when the statute in question affects the jurisdiction of a Court. Provisions relating to jurisdiction are more than matters of procedure. They touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute. See Colonial Sugar Refining Co., Ltd. v. Irving, 1905 AC 369. In United Provinces v. Mt. Atiqa Begum, AIR 1941 FC 16, Sulaiman J. observed :