(1.) I.A.No.1/2019 for condonation of delay of 16 days is allowed.
(2.) The brief facts of the case are as follows:
(3.) Contending that in view of the acquittal of accused No.1 in the predicate offence, prosecution of accused Nos.2 and 3 for the offence under section 3 of the PML Act cannot be sustained, accused Nos.2 and 3 along with accused No.1 moved an application under section 227 of Cr.P.C., seeking discharge. It was contended that in view of the acquittal of accused No.1 in the predicate offence, the very basis for prosecution of the accused having been vanished, no proceedings under the PML Act could be continued. It was also contended that the proceedings under the PML Act were initiated in respect of the offences which have been committed prior to the coming into force of PML Act. Considering the submissions of the accused and placing reliance on the decisions of the Delhi High Court in RAJIV CHANANA vs. DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT (Manu/DE/2403/2014) and the judgment of High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in ANOSH EKKA vs. ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE (W.P.(Cr.) No.257/2012 dd.19.2.2013) and MAHANIVESH OILS & FOODS PVT. LTD. vs. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT (W.P.(C) No .1925/2014 & CM.No.4017/2014 dd.25.01.2016) rendered by the High Court of Delhi, learned Trial Judge was of the view that the occurrence of a scheduled offence is a substratal condition for giving rise to 'proceeds of crime' and commission of 'scheduled offence' is a pre-condition for proceeding under the PML Act and with this reasoning, allowed the application in part and discharged accused Nos.2 and 3 from the alleged offences under section 3 of the PML Act.