LAWS(KAR)-2010-3-3

K S SRINIVASAIAH Vs. MUNIVENKATAMMA

Decided On March 15, 2010
K.S.SRINIVASAIAH Appellant
V/S
MUNIVENKATAMMA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellants were the defendants before the Trial Court in a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale. It was agreed between the parties that apart from the advance paid at the time of execution of the agreement, the entire consideration would be paid within three months from the date of agreement, in respect of house sites formed in agricultural land. But, as on the date of execution of the sale agreement, there was a prohibition of registration, by the Government. The transaction was to be completed immediately upon such ban being lifted, but notwithstanding the lifting of any such ban, the entire consideration was to be paid within three months from the date of agreement. It is further on record that a sum of Rs. 2,50,000/- was paid on expiry of three months and the entire sale consideration was not paid. Thereafter, the suit for specific performance having been filed, both the Courts below have held that the plaintiff is entitled to decree. It is questioning this, that the present second appeal is filed.

(2.) Counsel for the appellants would submit that both the Courts below have overlooked the glaring circumstance that time was of essence in the agreement of sale and the admitted circumstance that the entire sale consideration was unpaid did not indicate readiness and willingness in the performance of contract by the defendants and hence the Courts below were not justified in exercising the discretion in the light of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Having regard to the facts and circumstances, the receipt of Rs. 50,000/- by the defendants was in violation of the condition imposed by them and would indicate that there was a waiver of the condition of performance of the agreement within the time fixed. The defendants apparently have not taken any steps to terminate the contract or claim that there was a breach of contract. In this view of the matter, the plea, that the Courts below were required to treat the time as being of essence of contract is not a substantial question of law that would arise for consideration. Hence, there is no substantial question of law that would arise for consideration. The appeal is rejected.