STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. PRAKASHAIAH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal has been preferred by the State of Karnataka and the short point involved is the question as to whether the trial Court was justified in convicting the accused who was originally charged having committed an offence punishable under S. 326, IPC for the lesser offence under S. 335, IPC. The incident is within a narrow ambit in so far as it is alleged that on the afternoon of 21-6-1991, the complainant stopped a bullock cart in which the accused was taking some timber. According to the complainant, he found that one of the trees on his land had been cut and he maintains that he saw the timber from that tree being carried in the bullock cart which was why he insisted on stopping it and he told the accused that the timber must be brought to the complainant's house. Because of this some altercations took place whereupon the accused gave two blows to the complainant on his arm as a result of which, he sustained a fracture. The complainant lodged a complaint with the Police who registered an offence punishable under S. 326, IPC. The trial Court accepted the complainant's evidence which was supported by the medical evidence and convicted the accused. However, having regard to the complexion of the case, the Court held that even though grievous hurt had been caused that this had taken place under provocation and consequently recorded a conviction under S. 335, IPC. The accused was fined Rs. 2,000/- out of which Rs. 1,500/- was ordered to be paid as compensation to the complainant. The State has preferred this appeal challenging the acquittal under S. 326, IPC.

(2.) THE main point urged by the learned Additional S. P. P. is that the injury sustained by the complainant clearly indicates that it is a fracture and having regard to the definition of grievous hurt under S. 321, IPC it is his submission that the accused ought to have been convicted of the offence punishable under S. 326, IPC and awarded a sentence in consonance with what is provided for under that Section. He has seriously assailed the finding of the trial Court whereby the offence has been categorised as one falling under S. 335, IPC. His submission is that the accused was the wrong doer in sofar as he was taking away the timber which he had illegally obtained by cutting the tree on the complainant's land and that when he was stopped, he has displayed aggression by attacking the rightful owner of the property. His submission is that the evidence does not justify the provocation theory and secondly, that even if there was some cause given by the complainant who stopped the bullock cart, that he was doing so in exercise of his legal rights because the accused was decamping with stolen property which belonged to the complainant. In substance, he has contended that this is a case which requires intererence and that the trial Court's order will have to be rectified.

(3.) SINCE the respondent/accused was unrepresented, we have appointed learned Advocate Sri Somashekhar Angadi as Amicus Curiae. He has submitted that this is a case in which the Court must read between the lines in so far as the contention of the accused was that the timber was from a tree belonging to his father-in-law and that the complainant has nothing to do with it. His case was that he had been wrongly accused of theft and that the complainant had forcibly stopped the bullock cart and that it was the accused who was the aggressor in the incident as is evident from the fact that the complainant admits that there was an altercation prior to the assault. His submission is that the accused was wrongly accused of theft which itself is a provocation and secondly, that the complainant had given more than reasonable cause for the incident that ultimately occurred. Lastly, he has submitted that where the trial Court has considered the relevant facts and circumstancs particularly the complexion of the case, the conduct of the parties, the status of the accused andthe inadvisability of sending him to jail that the discretion to impose only a fine is perfectly valid and he points out to us that out of the fine amount a substantial compensation has been awarded to the injured/complainant. In this background, he submits that essential justice has been done and consequently this Court ought not to interfere.