V SUDEER Vs. BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Leave granted in the Special Leave Petitions.

(2.) These Writ Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India as well as the two special leave petitions being S.L.P. (C) Nos. 13755 of 1996 and 12989 moved by the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa and the Bar Council of India respectively raise a common question for our consideration, namely, whether the Bar Council of India Training Rules, 1995 (for short 'the Rules') as amended by the Resolution of the Bar Council of India in its meeting dated 19th July, 1998 relating to training to entrants of legal profession are within the competence of the Bar Council of India or are ultra vires its rule its rule making powers under the Advocates Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act') and in the alternative whether these Rules are unreasonable and arbitrary and hence violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

(3.) The writ petitioners, who have successfully completed their legal education by getting requisite Law degrees from the Universities concerned have contended before us in these writ petitions that their right to practise Law as made available under the relevant provisions of the Act is being arbitrarily denied by the impugned rules framed by the Bar Council of India and, therefore, their fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India is being violated. That the said Rules do not impose any reasonable restrictions on the exercise of their fundamental right. It is also contended that in any case, the Rules are so framed as to be totally unworkable and are highly unreasonable and discriminatory in character and hence they offend Article 14 of the Constitution of India also. The civil appeal arising out of the SLP by the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa brings in challenge the decision of the Bombay High Court which upheld the impugned rules and dismissed the writ petition filed by it and that is how the State Bar Council is before us. Its contention is on the same lines as canvassed by learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners. While civil appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 12989 of 1998 filed by the Bar Council of India, on the other hand, brings in challenge the Judgment and Order rendered by the learned single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court, who took the view in favour of the original writ petitioner-Respondent herein, that the impugned rules would not apply to the writ petitioner who had obtained his Law degree in 1981 as the Rules were purely prospective in character. It is, therefore, obvious that all these matters raise a common question regarding legality and validity of the impugned rules. If the Rules are upheld, then only further question whether they are prospective in nature or not would survive. This Court has treated the Writ Petition (Civil) No. 398 of 1996 as the leading petition and, therefore, we shall also refer to the pleadings of the parties and the relevant documents filed therein in the latter part of this judgment. By order dated 16th September, 1997, a three Judge Bench of this Court, presided over by S. C. Agrawal, J. appointed Shri Joseph Vellapally, learned senior advocate as amicus curiae to assist the Court on behalf of the petitioner. All other petitioners in person were permitted to submit their written submissions and the oral arguments were permitted to be submitted on behalf of all of them by learned amicus curiae senior advocate. We have to place on record our high sense of appreciation for the pains taken by amicus curiae Senior Advocate, Shri Joseph Vellapally, who has been good enough to look into all the relevant aspects of the matter and has placed his oral and written submissions in this connection. By order dated 21st February, 1997, another two Judge Bench of this Court, while treating writ petition (Civil) No. 398 of 1996 as a leading petition, directed that other petitions that are pending in the High Court or which may be filed thereafter shall remain stayed till further orders of this Court. The parties have exchanged relevant pleadings which are all brought on record supported by documents on which they rely.