STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH Vs. TARA DUTT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Leave granted.

(2.) The State of Himachal Pradesh has preferred this appeal against the Judgment of the learned single Judge of the Himachal Pradesh High Court, who being of the opinion that conviction in respect of a minor offence where charges had been framed for a major offence becomes barred under Section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code, as on the date of cognizance for such minor offence the provisions of Section 468 gets attracted. The short facts necessary for disposal of this appeal are that the two respondents herein were challenged for offences under Sections 468, 420, 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and for the offence under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The offence in question was alleged to have been committed in the year 1983 by forging the receipts under the 'Scab Control Scheme, 1983". The charge-sheet was submitted in Nov. 1987 and cognizance was taken in Dec. 1987. Charges were framed under Sections 468, 420, 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Learned Special Judge acquitted them of the charges under Sections 468 and 420, IPC and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act but convicted them under Sections 417 and 465 read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code. Some other accused persons who had also been tried along with the respondents herein were acquitted fully. On appeal, the High Court of Himachal Pradesh on an analysis of Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure came to the conclusion that for the offences for which the two respondents have been convicted by the Special Judge namely Sections 417 and 465 of the Indian Penal Code, the cognizance taken on 31-12-1987 was barred by limitation and, therefore, he acquitted the accused persons. The High Court also came to the conclusion that though under Section 478 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the power to condone the delay taking cognizance was there for cogent reasons but since the learned Special Judge has not exercised that power inasmuch no such reasons had been recorded, the said provisions cannot be pressed into service. Having recorded the conclusion that the cognizance itself was barred by limitation, the High Court also in the penultimate para of the impugned Judgment expressed opinion on merits and held that the offence under Sections 417 and 465 would not stand proved.

(3.) When the matter was placed before a Bench of two learned Judges, it was felt that the decision of this Court in Arun Vyas v. Anita Vyas, (1999) 4 SCC 690, requires reconsideration by a larger Bench of three Judges and that is how the matter has been placed before us.