LAWS(SC)-1989-2-27

GHANSHYAM DAS GUPTA Vs. DEVILAL

Decided On February 08, 1989
GHANSHYAM DAS GUPTA Appellant
V/S
DEVILAL Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question which arises in this appeal by special leave is whether the default by a tenant in payment of rent for the period before the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Bihar Rent Act') , was extended and became applicable, can be the basis for holding him a defaulter within the meaning of clause (d) of S. 11 (1) of the Bihar Rent Act, 1947 and, therefore, liable to be evicted.

(2.) The building in question is in Danapur Cantonment area near the town of Patna. The appellant was inducted as a tenant therein by the owner one Janki Devi under a document of lease for a fixed period. Since the deed was not executed in accordance with the requirements of law it remained inoperative. After the period was over, Janki Devi instituted a suit on 10/12/1968 for eviction of the appellant and for a decree for arrears of rent for the period May to August 1968, which was registered as Title Suit No. 317 of 1968. The Bihar Rent Act was not then applicable to Danapur Cantonment. During the pendency of the case on 14/02/1970 the provisions of the Bihar Rent Act were extended to this area. Presumably in view of the fact that the lease deed could not be treated to be valid in the eye of law, a prayer for withdrawal of the relief for eviction was made by the plaintiff and was allowed with leave to file a fresh suit. A decree for arrears of rent, however, was passed.

(3.) The present suit was filed on 28/05/1974 for eviction of the appellant on the grounds of bona fide personal necessity and default in payment of rent for the periods May to July, October and November 1968, December 196 9/02/1970, and December 197 3/04/1974. The trial court decreed the suit on both the grounds. On appeal by the appellant, the learned Subordinate Judge reversed the finding on the question of bona fide personal necessity but affirmed the decree on the ground of default. The High court has by the impugned judgment maintained the decree.