STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR Vs. MAHMOOD AHMED

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Leave granted.

(2.) Though the High Court has accepted the case of the State and dismissed the second appeal preferred by the respondents herein, the State has been prompted to file this appeal because of the observations made by the High Court that Ss. 8 and 14 of the Evacuee (Administration of Property) Act, 2006 (hereinafter referred as to the Act) have outlived their purpose and hence the concerned officers of the State need not entertain any applications made in future under Ss. 8 of the Act by persons laying claim to properties which have been notified as evacuee property under the Act.

(3.) To appreciate the grievance of the State over the pronouncement of the High Court about relevancy and operational force of S. 8 of the Act, a few facts require mention. Respondent No. 1 claimed to be the owner of Evacuee Property House No. 487 situate in Talab Khatikan, Jammu and sold the same to respondents 2 and 3 for a total consideration of Rs. 16,000/- under a sale deed dated 12-12-1970. By an order dated 5-2-1973, the custodian (third appellant) held that the sale was invalid since the property was evacuee property and belonged to one Shah Mahmood who had migrated to Pakistan during the disturbance of 1947 and continued to live there as an evacuee. Against the order of the custodian the respondents preferred an appeal to the Custodan General (second appellant). The Custodian General dismissed the appeal but observed that if any application had been made by the first respondent under S. 8 regarding the house, the Custodian may dispose of the same in accordance with law. He also observed that if the respondents felt that they were entitled under law to make a claim under S. 25 of the Act, they may move the appropriate forum in that behalf. Thereafter, the respondents made two applications one under S. 8 on 14-3-1974 and another under S. 25 on 24-4-1974 to the Custodian. The Custodian noticed that the application under S. 8 had been presented beyond the prescribed limitation period of two months after the order dated 5-2-1973 had been passed but even so he considered the application on merits and rejected it. Likewise, the application under S. 25 was also rejected. Once again, an appeal was preferred to the Custodian General and he dismissed the appeal holding that there was no need for the custodian to have gone into the merits of the case when the direction given in the earlier appeal was only to see if any application under S. 8 had already been presented and was pending consideration.