DATTATRYA SHANKARBHAT AMBALGI Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioners in these petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution hold land within the city of Sholapur in the State of Maharashtra. According to the petitioners development plan has been sanctioned with regard to land situated in the city of Sholapur including the petitioners' land under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the Maharashtra Act No. 37 of 1966) and some land of the petitioners was reserved for public purpose under that Act. The Urban Land (Ceiling. and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was brought into force on 28th February, 1976 and proceedings for acquisition of vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit placed under the Act wire initiated against the petitioners, These writ petitions have been filed for the following reliefs:

(2.) It has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners that S. 125 of the Maharashtra Act No. 37 of 1966 contemplates. inter alia, that any land required, reserved or designated in a development plan for a public purpose shall be deemed to be land needed for a public purpose within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act. 1894 whereas S. 126 thereof contains the procedure for acquisition of land required for public purposes. According to learned counsel if land is acquired as contemplated by Ss. 125 and 126 aforesaid, the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act shall apply to the acquisition of the said land with the modification that the market value of the land shall be computed as contemplated by sub-sec. (3) of S. 126 whereas if the land was acquired under the Act, compensation payable would be much less as contemplated by S. 11 of the Act and that too with a ceiling of two lakhs of rupees as provided by sub-sec. (6) thereof. It has been urged that it is left to the sweet will of the authorities concerned to acquire land either under Ss. 125 and 126 of the Maharashtra Act No. 37 of 1966 or under the provisions of S. 10 of the Act and that since in the event of proceedings for acquisition being taken under S. 10 of the Act as is sought to be done in the case of the petitioners the compensation payable would be far less than the compensation payable if the acquisition is made under the Maharashtra Act No. 37of 1966, discrimination under Art. 14 of the Constitution was writ large, and in this view of the matter the petitioners are entitled to the reliefs claimed in these writ petitions.

(3.) Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that none of the reliefs prayed for in the writ petitions can be granted to the petitioners. At the very outset, it may -be pointed out that the Act has been placed in the 9th Schedule to the Constitution at S1. No. 132 and consequently comes under the protective umbrella of Art. 31B of the Constitution. In Maharao Sahib Shri Bheem Singhji v. Union of India, (1985) 1 Suppl. SCR 862 it has been held by a Constitution Bench of this Court that the Act is constitutionally valid save and except S. 27(l) to the extent mentioned in the judgment. With regard to sub-sec. (6) of S. 11, it has specifically been held at page 879 of the Report that this sub-section which provides that compensation payable under S. 11 shall in no case exceed two lakhs of rupees is valid. The amount thus payable is not illusory and the provision is not confiscatory. Rupees two lakhs are not like a farthing even if the excess land may be a fortune. In this connection, it may be pointed out that it has not been urged by the learned. counsel for the petitioners that the provisions of the Act which have been impugned in the present writ petitions in any way damage or destroy a basic or essential feature of the Constitution or its basic structure. No statutory provision either in the Act or even in the Maharashtra Act No. 37 of 1966 has been brought to our notice excluding the operation of the Act with regard to lands reserved for public purpose under the Maharashtra Act No. 37 of 1966. On the other hand, there is a specific overriding provision in S. 42 of the Act which provides that the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith in any other law for the time being in force or any custom., usage or agreement or decree or order of a Court, Tribunal or other authority. It is in this view of the matter that we are of the opinion that none of the reliefs prayed for in the present writ petitions can be granted.