(1.) The petitioner has pressed before us certain points of law which have not been urged before the High court and so we are unable to examine the tenability of those points. For this reason, the petition must be dismissed.
(2.) Counsel drew our attention to the fact that although the episode, which is the subject-matter of the prosecution under S. 16 (IA) (i) , read with S. 7 (1) and S. 2 (IA) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, took place allegedly in 1972, there was inexplicable, inordinate delay in trial. The case was tried in 1977 which, according to counsel, prejudiced the petitioner considerably. We are aghast at the traumatic impact on criminal justice inflicted by delayed trials when human memory becomes faded and vivid testimony is withheld. The present case is an instance in point.-We feel strongly that the trial courts in the country should ensure that, in the spirit of Article 21 of the Constitution, food adulteration cases, which involve imprisonment, are tried expeditiously so that neither the prosecution nor the accused is prejudiced by unusual judicial procrastination. We express the hope that the High court concerned will issue peremptory directions to trial Judges demanding expeditious disposal of such cases. In the present case, prosecution evidence, as regards taking of samples, is perhaps not as good as it would have been had the trial been prompt. We do not want forensic martyrdom's for prosecutions in food adulteration cases, thanks to tarred trials blamable on the judicial process. The State government has a duty to sanction the required courts in obedience to the mandate of Article 21 which implies judicial justice without undue delay.
(3.) Maybe, there is some grievance for the petitioner that he was disabled in defending himself properly, hampered by the lapse of five years, but unfortunately the point was not pressed before the High court; and, we do not think it proper to investigate the substantiality of the prejudice.