KEWAL SINGH Vs. LAJWANTI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order of the Delhi High Court dated the 6th April, 1978 dismissing the revision petition filed by the appellant against an order of the Rent Controller. For the purpose of brevity and to avoid confusion the appellant shall hereafter be referred to as the Defendant and the respondent as the plaintiff.

(2.) The defendant appellant was inducted as a tenant by the plaintiff in Quarter No. IV-H/46, Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi on 1-7-1967. On 2nd June, 1976 the plaintiff filed an application under Ss. 14A (1), 14 (1) (e) and 14 (1) (f) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, for eviction of the tenant firstly on the ground that as the husband of the plaintiff was required by the Government to vacate the Government quarter or pay the penal rent the husband of the plaintiff had to shift to the house of his wife which was in the tenancy of the defendant. A prayer was also made by the plaintiff that even otherwise the premises were required for a bona fide necessity of the landlady and also as the premises had become unfit for human habitation the plaintiff required the same for carrying out repairs which could not be done unless the premises were vacated. On the next date, that is, on 3rd June, 1967 (1976 ) the plaintiff filed an application withdrawing the cause of action mentioned by her regarding bona fide necessity and repairs as contemplated by Ss. 14 (1) (e) and 14 (1) (f) of the Act. The defendant appellant at this time was nowhere in the picture and no notice had yet been served on him. The Rent Controller accordingly allowed the plaintiff to withdraw the two causes of action mentioned in the application. Thereafter notice was issued to the defendant. On the 4th June, 1976 the plaintiff again sought to amend her petition by deleting the cause of action mentioned under S. 14-A (1) of the Act, that is to say, requirement of the plaintiff because her husband had been directed to vacate the Government quarter. This was perhaps necessitated because there were some amendments in the Government Rules on the subject. On the 13th August, 1976 the defendant appeared before the Rent Controller and filed an application under S. 25B, sub-ss. (4) and (5) requesting the Rent Controller to give the defendant permission to defend the suit, on the ground that as the landlady was not a Government servant she was not entitled to maintain the eviction petition under S. 14A (1) of the Act. The defendant also raised some other contentions. On 6-10-1976 the husband of the plaintiff filed an application for being impleaded as a party, but this application on was rejected on 22-11-1976. The plaintiff thereafter again filed another application on 27-1-1977 praying for amendment of her eviction application by re-inserting the cause of action contained in S. 14 (1) (e) of the Act and sought to claim eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement. This application was contested by the defendant but was allowed by the Rent Controller by his order dated 19-2-1977. The Rent Controller however left it open to the defendant to file his objection by a fresh application if he wanted to defend the suit. The defendant accordingly filed an application on the 9th March, 1977 for permission to defend the suit on the ground that the amendment sought for by the plaintiff was uncalled for and illegal and could not be allowed. Ultimately the Rent Controller by his order dated 27th July, 1977 rejected the application of the defendant for leave to appear and defend the suit and passed an order evicting the defendant from the premises. Being aggrieved by this order the defendant went up in revision to the Delhi High Court as no appeal or second appeal against the order passed by the Rent Controller was maintainable under sub-s. (8) of S. 25B of the Act. The revision petition was heard by Justice Prakash Narain of the Delhi High Court who by his order dated 6th April, 1978 dismissed the revision petition with costs. Thereafter, the petitioner approached this Court and obtained special leave. Hence this appeal.

(3.) On a perusal of the judgment of the Rent Controller and that of the High Court prima facie it seems to us that the appeal was clearly concluded by findings of fact inasmuch as both the Courts had found that the plaintiff had proved that she required the premises for her bona fide necessity. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, raised three points of law before us. In the first place, it was argued that the second application given by the plaintiff for re-amending her plaint by inserting the relief under S. 14 (1) (e) which she had given up on a prior occasion when she had based her suit under S. 14A (1) was barred by the principles of O. 2, R. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.