STATE OF RAJASTHAN Vs. RAGHUBIR SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE State of Rajasthan, defendant in Civil Suit No. 9 of 1963 in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Udaipur, is the appellant in this appeal filed pursuant to a certificate granted under Article 133 (1) (a) of the Constitution of India (as it stood prior to the 30th amendment). THE plaintiff respondent took a building work on contract from the erstwhile Government of the State of Udaipur. He completed the work on 6/06/1950. Despite demands and notices issued by the plaintiff a considerable amount due to him remained unpaid. He, therefore, filed the suit out of which the appeal arises to recover a sum of Rs. 5,19,458/11.00 together with interest at the rate of 12 Per Cent . THE suit was contested by the State of Rajasthan. An interim decree for a sum of Rs. 66,517 was passed on 7/11/1955. After full trial a decree for Rs. 1,67,619 (including the sum of Rupees 66,517 for which a preliminary decree had already been passed) was passed on 11-6-1958/30-6-1958. THE decree also awarded interest at the rate of 41/2 Per Cent on the amount decreed from the date of suit till the date of realisation. THE plaintiff and the defendant preferred appeals to the High Court to Rajasthan. THE High Court reduced the decretal amount by a sum of Rs. 9,991. THE High Court, however, held that the plaintiff was entitled to interest from 1/01/1951, and not merely from the date of suit. THE High Court also enhanced the rate of interest pendente lite from 4 1/2 Per Cent to 6 per cent. THE High Court having varied the decree of the trial Court, the State of Rajasthan sought and obtained a certificate under Article 133 (1) (a) of the Constitution and has filed this appeal.

(2.) THE controversy in the High Court related primarily to (i) conveyance and lift charges; (ii) alleged double benefit in regard to bond-stone, lintels and sills; (iii) use of Jodhpur slabs and their high cost; (iv) charge for C. P. Teak wood at the same rates a for Burma Teak. In regard to conveyance and lift charges the High Court pointed out that no question was raised in the Memorandum of grounds of appeal and there was, therefore, no justification for permitting the learned counsel for the State to assail the finding of the trial Court relating to those charges. We do not see any reason either why the learned counsel should be permitted to agitate this question in this appeal. Regarding double-charge for bond-stone, lintels and sills, the complaint of the appellant was that while separate payment was being made for them, they had also been included in the measurements of the walls in which they happened to be fixed. From the office circular issued by the Chief Engineer of the Public Works Department of the United State of Rajasthan on 12/07/1948, it appears that it was the practice up till then to allow payment for bond-stones, lintels and sills separately without deducting their cubic contents from the general wall masonry. This had always been the practice and this was never objected to by the Accountant General. In view of the practice obtaining till then it could not be said that the contractor had wrongfully claimed double payment for bond-stones, lintels and sills. THE use of Jodhpur slabs was not questioned in the written statement. All that was said was that the rate was high but at the trial there was no evidence worth the name, as observed by the High Court to show that the charge was excessive. Again there was no objection to the use of C. P. Teak Wood instead of Burma Teak Wood as the latter was not available. According to the letter of the Superintending Engineer dated 6/02/1950, where Burma teak wood was not available and C. P. teak wood was used, the rate specified for Burma teak wood should be taken for C. P. teak wood. It could not, therefore, be said that the contractor had charged more than what he should have for C. P. teak wood.

(3.) IN Mahabir Prashad Rungta v. Durga Datt ( AIR 1961 SC 990) interest was disallowed on the ground that the notice which was given did not specify the sum which was demanded and therefore, the INterest Act did not apply. On the question whether interest could be awarded on grounds of equity it was held that what was claimed by Durga Datt was interest as damages and that it could not, therefore, be awarded. The suit itself was one for damages for breach of contract. We do not think that this case is of any assistance to the appellant. IN Union of INdia v. A. L. Rallia Ram (AIR 1963 SC 1685) the Arbitrator had awarded interest by way of compensation since the party had to borrow a large amount of money from its banker to meet its obligation under the contract. The Supreme Court pointed out that interest could not be awarded by way of damages. The Supreme Court also noticed that an Arbitrator was not a Court within the meaning of the INterest Act. No question arose before the Supreme Court whether interest could not be awarded under the INterest Act merely because the notice demanding payment mentioned that the plaintiff had suffered loss of interest also. IN our view the condition prescribed by the INterest Act that such demand shall give notice to the debtor that interest shall be claimed is fulfilled if interest is claimed, notwithstanding the fact that the notice of demand explains that loss by way of interest has been suffered. To take any other view would be to over-technical in the construction of pleadings, including notices preceding the action.