SHAKUNTALA SAWHNEY Vs. KAUSHALYA SAWHNEY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) A judgment often possesses a sublime essence and a humdrum component. The appeal before us, in its happy conclusion, holds out the higher lesson that hate and fight are dissolved by basic human fellow- ship, even after bitter litigative struggle, if the bench and the Bar pursue consensual justice, and bring into play conciliatory processes, and successfully persuade the parties to see reason and right beyond bare law. If the efforts succeed, as it has in this case, court and counsel derive spiritual fulfilment and get satisfaction.

(2.) Two sisters, apparently of the affluent bracket, with a common father but different mothers, became estranged when one (the appellant) claimed a half share in the estate of the father, on whose death before 1956, therespondent's mother inherited her husband's estate but died after 1956, possessed of her husband's assets and her own. When intestate succession to her opened the plaintiff-appellant claimed a half share therein, founded on S. 15 (l) (a) of the Hindu Succession Act (the Act, for short). The High court negatived the right to a share as an heir, and, in doing so, preferred the interpretation of the provision adopted by the then Mysore High court as against the meaning attached to the provision by the Allahabad High court. In fact, a plurality of decisions has been brought to our notice indicating a plain conflict. Interpretation is sometimes a projection of judicial inclination to do justice.

(3.) The question of law canvassed before us turns on the meaning of "son" and "daughter" in the setting of S. 15 (l) (a) of the Act. Do the expressions include step-son and step-daughter or embrace only the son and daughter of the deceased female propositus The text and the context and the application of traditional rules of statutory interpretation leave the position in an unsatisfactory dilemma of dual import. Even an equitable approach may not necessarily help reach a just solution, because equity shifts as the situation varies, as illustrations presented to us convinced us. Thus, the problem is a little tricky and may well arise frequently. Contradictory positions already taken by different High courts add to the difficulty and result in the deleterious uncertainty of the law which may well incite, as it has done here, close relations to quarrel over property. Blood may be thicker than water, but wealth breaks all relations in a world of material value sets. The Supreme court may, when the High courts disagree, resolve the logomachic conflict by exercising its preference guided by the language and the milieu and following the customary canons of statutory interpretation. While its decision will be binding on account of Article 141 of the Constitution, it may still be fallible because the intendment of Parliament is best brought out by legislative clarification. In the present instance, we have a hunch that the specific point of claim by step-sons and step-daughters to inherit to the estate of a deceased female has escaped Parliament's attention while fashioning the legislation. This is not surprising when we appreciate the push and pressure, hurry and worry of law-making modalities. In such a situation, when a sharp conflict has shown up in the rulings of courts, the matter should not be left in doubt or to forensic-linguistic exercises but must be settled by legislative action on the part of Parliament, making explicit its policy on this branch of the Hindu Succession Act. Inaction leads to more litigation, speculation and compulsion for judicial legislation by the Supreme court. Drafting lapses are understandable but when differences of interpretation come into the open, delay in correctional parliamentary performance is fraught with negative litigative potential. We are hopeful that the Indian draftsmen will disprove the old English jingle: