LAWS(SC)-1979-2-41

S MOHAN LAL Vs. R KONDIAH

Decided On February 02, 1979
S.MOHAN LAL Appellant
V/S
R.KONDIAH Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The short question for consideration in this appeal is whether the practice of the legal profession is 'business' within the meaning of Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. The question arises this way. The respondent, an Advocate filed an application before the Rent Controller seeking eviction of the appellant, his tenant, from the premises in question on the ground that he required the premises for the purpose of carrying on his profession as an Advocate. The application was contested by the appellant who was carrying on the business of manufacturing art jewellery in the premises. We are not concerned in this appeal with the several defences which were raised by the appellant. Nor are we concerned with the vicissitudes which the case underwent. For the purposes of this appeal it is sufficient to say that the final Court of fact, namely, the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes, Hyderabad, found that the respondent bona fide required the premises for the purpose of carrying on his profession as an Advocate and that the profession as an Advocate and that the tenancy was not such as could be split up. The appellate authorities passed an order of eviction against the appellant. Before the High Court, in revision, it was contended by the appellant that the practice of the profession of an Advocate was not business within the meaning of Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) and, therefore, the respondent could not seek the eviction of the appellant on the ground that he required the premises for the purpose of carrying on his profession as an Advocate. It was contended that Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) used the expression 'business' only and not the expression 'profession'. The contention was negatived by a Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh consisting of Gopalrao Ekbote and Ramachandra Rao, JJ. The tenant has appealed by special leave to this Court.

(2.) Dr. Chitaley learned counsel for the appellant argued that there was a clear distinction between 'business' and 'profession' and that the practice of a liberal profession like that of an Advocate or a Doctor which had nothing commercial about it was not business within the meaning of Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. He argued that though the Andhra Pradesh Act broadly classified buildings into residential and non-residential buildings, the landlord of a non-residential building could not seek to evict his tenant on the ground of his requirement unless it was for the purpose of carrying on a business. According to the learned Counsel this indicated that the expression business was to be given a narrow meaning and was to be confined to activities of a commercial nature. The learned Counsel also urged that the Court should favour a construction which would be beneficent to the tenant. Dr. Chitaley relied on M. P. Sethurama Menon v. Meenakshi Amma (supra), Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa (1978) 3 SCR 207), and Stuchbery v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corpn. Ltd. ((1949) 2 KBD 256).

(3.) The expression business has not been defined in the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. It is a common expression which is sometimes used by itself and sometimes in a collocation of words as in "business, trade or profession". It is a word of large and wide import, capable of a variety of meanings. It is needless to refer to the meanings given to that term in the various Dictionaries except to say that everyone of them noticed a large number of meanings of the word. In a broad sense it is taken to mean 'everything that occupies the time, attention and labour of men for the purpose of livelihood or profit'. In a narrow sense it is confined to commercial activity. It is obvious that the meaning of the word must be gleaned from the context in which it is used. Reference to the provisions of the Constitution or other statutes where the expression is used cannot be of any assistance in determining its meaning in Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. It is not a sound principle of construction to interpret expressions used in one Act with reference to their use in another Act; more so if the two Acts in which the same word is used are not congate Acts, Neither the meaning, nor the definition of the term in one statute affords a guide to the construction of the same term in another statute and the sense in which the term has been understood in the several statutes does not necessarily throw any light on the manner in which the term should be understood generally. On the other hand it is a sound, and, indeed, a well known principle of construction that meaning of words and expressions used in an Act must take their colour from the context in which they appear. Dr. Chitaley very frankly and fairly conceded as much.