MANI SUBRAT JAIN Vs. RAJA RAM VOHRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The Holmesian homily that the life of the law is not logic but experience directs our humane attention, in this appeal against an order in execution for eviction of an advocate in Chandigarh, affirmed by court after court to a reading of the textual definition of 'tenant' (S.2 (i)) in the context of the broad embargo on ejectment of urban dwellings in S. 13 of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).

(2.) Chandigarh, a blossom in the desert, has served as the capital of two States; and, with explosive expansion, thanks to the marvellous human resources of Punjab and Haryana, become a crowded, though not yet chaotic, city with chronic accommodation scarcity. Consequently, laissez faire law, in the matter of landlord's right to evict his tenant, was subject to the Act with effect from 4-11-1972. From then on, no tenant could be dispossessed except on the grounds set out in S. 13. But if a landlord had already obtained a decree for eviction earlier to this date line, was he to be restrained by S. 13 which forbade even execution of decrees against tenants, or was he free from the statutory fetters because the defendant had ceased to be a tenant on the passing of the decree, having forfeited his status by the destructive effect of a compromise, as in this case

(3.) An advocate, under this Act, belongs to a 'scheduled' class of tenants whose dwellings enjoy special protection. The appellant-advocate tenanted a building belonging to the respondent. The latter sued for possession and the former, with refreshing realism, entered into a compromise and agreed to vacate by a certain date on certain terms regarding rent which do not bear upon the dispute before us. A decree in terms thereof was passed on 9-10-1972. Then came the Act, which by extension of its operation, applied to Chandigarh with effect from 4-11-1972. Had the decree been passed but a few days' later, the Act would have admittedly interdicted the eviction because of S. 13. Had the decree been made and executed a day before the extension of the Act, the years of litigative procrastination of eviction might have been impossible. These mystic 'might-have-beens' are gambles of time which spill beyond our jurisdiction and statutory cognisance. The salvation of the appellant is certain if he be a 'tenant' within the meaning of the Act. His eviction is certain if the definition of 'tenant' does not ensconce him in its amplitude.