MOTI LAL Vs. NANAK CHAND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The first respondent's suit for a decree in ejectment against the appellants in respect of certain premises held by the latter as tenants was dismissed by the Court of First Instance on the decision of a preliminary issue. The District Court reversed the decree and remanded the suit. A revision application filed before the High Court was rejected. The tenant has appealed to this Court with special leave.

(2.) The judgment under appeal in this case has been expressly overruled by this Court in S. Sanyal v. Gian Chand, 1968 1 SCR 536. This Court held that where the owner of a house let it out to a tenant for residence and for running a school a suit in ejectment on the ground of bonafide personal requirement was not maintainable, and it was not open to the Court to demarcate the portions used for residential and non-residential purposes. The Court held in that case that the contract of tenancy was a single and indivisible contract and in the absence of a statutory provision to that effect it is not open to the court to divide it into two contacts, one of letting for residential purposes, and the other for non-residential purposes, and to grant relief under Section 13(1) (e) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, in respect of the portion of the property used for residential purposes. The view taken to the contrary by the Punjab High Court in the case under appeal was, it was observed, inconsistent with the judgment of this Court in Dr. Gopal Das Verma v. S.K. Bhardwaj and another, 1962 2 SCR 678.

(3.) Mr. Bishan Narain appearing on behalf of the respondent landlord contends that in substance there were two tenancies in respect of two definite portions of the house let to the meant, one to be used for residential purposes and the other for non-residential purposes, and therefore the rule laid down by this Court in Dr. Gopal Das Verma V. S K BHARDWAJ, 1962 2 SCR 678 and S. Sanyal,1996 1 SCR 536 has no application. We have carefully considered the covenants of the agreement to tenancy. We are unable to hold that it was the intention of the parties to writ two separate tenancies for two different parts of the house in one deed. The tenancy is a single tenancy in respect of the entire premises. The covenant for payment of rent is indivisible, and the other covenants of tenancy dealing with the obligations of the landlord and the tenant are also indivisible. It is therefore impossible to accept the contention that it was intended to writ two independent contracts of tenancy in a single document.