INDU BHUSHAN BOSE Vs. RAMA SUNDARI DEBI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Rama Sundari Debi, the first respondent in this appeal by special leave, instituted a suit for the ejectment of Indu Bhusan Bose appellant who was a tenant in premises No.18, Riverside Road, owned by respondent No.1, situated within the cantonment area of Barrackpore. The agreed rent was Rs.250 per mensem; but there was a dispute as to whether the owner or the tenant was liable to pay rates and taxes. On an application presented by the appellant, the Rent Controller fixed fair rent under Section 10 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act No. XII of 1956 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") at Rs.170 per month inclusive of all cantonment taxes, and, in appeal, the amount was enhanced to Rs.188 per month inclusive of all cantonment taxes. Respondent No.1, in December, 1960, served a notice on the appellant to quit and, on falling to get vacant possession, filed a suit in the Court of the Munsif. In the plaint, respondent No.1 claimed that, regulation of house accommodation including control of rents being a subject in Entry No.3 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the State Legislature could not competently enact a law on the same subject for cantonment areas, so that the appellant was not entitled to protection under the Act which had been extended to that area by the State Government. It was urged that the extension of that State Act to the cantonment area was ultra vires and void. The Munsif, thereupon, made a reference under Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the High Court of Calcutta for decision of this constitutional question raised in the suit before him. The High Court decided the reference by making a declaration that the notification, whereby the State Government had extended the provisions of the act to the Barrackpore cantonment area, was ultra vires and void. This is the decision of the High Court that has been challenged in this appeal.

(2.) It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that the High Court is not correct in holding that the field of Legislation covered by the Act, which is primarily concerned with control of rents and eviction of tenants, is included within the expression "regulation of house accommodation in cantonment areas" used in entry No.8 of List I. That entry is as follows:-

(3.) On the scope of Entry 3 of List I, the argument advanced is that Parliament is empowered to legislate in respect of house accommodation situated in cantonment areas only to the extent that that house accommodation is needed for military purposes and laws are required for requistioning or otherwise obtaining possession of that accommodation for such purposes. In the alternative, the submission made is that regulation of house accommodation by parliamentary law should be confined to houses acquired, requisitioned or allotted for military purposes. This Entry 3, according to the appellant, should not be read as giving Parliament the power to legislate on the relationship of landlord and tenant in respect of houses situated in cantonment areas if such houses are let out privately by a private owner to his tenant and have nothing at all to do with the requirements of the military. We are unable to accept this submission. The language of the entry itself does not justify any such interpretation. In the entry when power is granted to Parliament to make laws for the regulation of house accommodation in cantonment areas, there are no qualifying words to indicate that the house accommodation, which is to be subject to such legislation, must be accommodation required for military purposes, or must be accommodation that has already been acquired, requisitioned or allotted to the military. In fact, if a legislation in respect of any cantonment was to be undertaken by Parliament for the first time under this entry, there would be, at the time of that legislation, no house in the cantonment already acquired, requisitioned or allotted for military purposes; and, if the interpretation sought to be put on behalf of the appellant were accepted, the power of Parliament to pass laws cannot be exercised by Parliament at all. It is also significant that, in the entry, various items, which can be the subject-matter of legislation by Parliament, are mentioned separately, and these are:-