STATE OF ASSAM Vs. HARISINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) On August 20, 1963 the Divisional Forest Officer, Kachar Division in the Slate of Assam invited, for the years 1963-66, tenders for purchase of the forest produce in the Lakhipur range. The first respondent Hari Singh offered a bid of Rs. 6,543/-and the fourth respondent Safique Uddin offered Rs. 6,667-67 ps. At the suggestion of the Divisional Forest Officer the first respondent raised his offer to Rs. 6,667-67. On October 16, 1963 the Divisional Forest Officers provisionally accepted the tender of the first respondent. The acceptance was subject to an order in appeal to the Conservator of Forests. In appeal by the fourth respondent the Conservator of Forests, Assam, without issuing a notice of the appeal or giving any other intimation to the first respondent set aside the acceptance of the first respondent's tender. The Conservator observed:--

(2.) Counsel for the state of Assam contended that the state was dealing with its own property and it was, as expressly set out in the terms of auction, not bound to accept the highest or any tender and that the superior officers were competent not withstanding the order made by the Divisional Forest Officer to accept any tender they thought proper and in the interest of the State to accept. It was urged that the proceeding before the Divisional Forest Officer and before the Conservator of Forests was essentially administrative and the last named officer was under no obligation to give notice to the first respondent or to hear him before modifying the order of the Divisional Forest Officer and rejecting the older of the first respondent which was already accepted.

(3.) The Divisional Forest Officer was, it is true, not bound to accept the highest or any tender. His action was purely administrative and unless it was shown to be mala fide it was not subject to interference by the Courts. But when an appeal lay against the action of the Divisional Forest Officer, in our judgment, a duty was superimposed by the clearest implication that the appellate officer must act fairly and in consonance with the rules of natural justice. The appellate authorities could interfere with the order on grounds which stand the test of reason, and are not arbitrary or irrelevant.