JAI NARAIN Vs. KISHANCHAND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal by a tenant who bad rented a shop No. 2687 in Kinari Bazar, Delhi from the respondent on Rs. 13.50 P. per month. In those premises be was selling Usha sewing machines and fans. It appears that the level of the shop was too high from the road and his clients were troubled in going to his shop and so he lowered the level and thereby altered the premises to suit his convenience. The landlord thereupon filed a suit against him for his eviction under Section 13 (1) (k) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. The suit was filed on November 13, 1957. The trial Court ordered on February 19, 1959, ejectment and payment of Rs. 145 as arrears of rent. An appeal against the order of the trial Court was dismissed by the appellate authority on November 16, 1959. A revision application was then filed by the tenant on March 25, 1960. During the course of that revision he invoked the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 which had come into force on February 9, 1959 and relied upon Section 14 (1) of the new Act read with Section 57. Previously he had not relied upon the new Act although the Act had been in force during the pendency of the previous proceedings. The High Court acting under Section 14 (1) (j) and sub-sec. (10) of the same section, gave him the alternative of paying compensation in the sum of Rs. 500/- which it appears that the landlord himself had assessed as the damages caused by the act of the tenant. The landlord later filed an application for review of the order and pointed out that the new Act was not applicable to the case in view of the first proviso of Section 57 sub-section (2). The High Court thereupon granted the review and reversed its earlier order and ordered the eviction of the tenant.

(2.) In this appeal it is contended that the High Court was in error in passing the order on review and that the previous order was the correct order in the light of the provisions of the Act of 1958. We have therefore to consider which of the two orders of the High Court is the correct order and whether the review was properly granted or not.

(3.) As is very frequent in our country, Rent Control Acts are changed from time to time causing numerous difficulties in their interpretation and application. Here too, we have a succession of Acts which were passed, to say nothing of the amendments which were made in the body of each of the Acts as they came. We are concerned first with the Act of 1952, namely, The Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. Section 13 (1)(k) of that Act gave a right to the landlord to evict a tenant who whether before or after the commencement of the Act had caused or permitted to be caused substantial damage to the premises or notwithstanding previous notice, had used or dealt with the premises in a manner contrary to any condition imposed on the landlord by the Government or the Delhi Improvement Trust while giving him a lease of the land on which the premises were situated. We are not concerned with the latter part but with the first part where the tenant before or after the commencement of the Act had caused or permitted to be caused substantial damage to the premises. Whether the lowering of the floor was causing substantial damage to the premises is a question into which we need not go, because the concurrent finding of the Courts of fact is that it did so. This question was not raised before us. Therefore, if Sec. 13 (1) (k) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 applied, the eviction of the tenant was the proper order to make in view of the finding that he had caused substantial damage to the premises. However, the matter comes to the Court because of the passing of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 which came into force on February 9, 1959. Section 57 (1) of that Act provided that the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952 in so far as it was applicable to the Union Territory of Delhi, was being repealed. While repealing it, a special saving was however made by sub-section (2) of the same section in favour of all suits and other proceedings which were then pending under the repealed Act and it was provided that those suits and proceedings should be continued and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Act as if that Act had continued to be in force and the new Act had not been passed. This would have really been a very proper provision to make to separate the operation of the two Acts but the Legislature went still further and added two provisos. We are concerned only with the first of the two provisos on which much dispute has arisen in this case. That proviso reads as follows: