CHIMANLAL PREMCHAND Vs. STATE OF BOMBAY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay setting aside that of the First Class Magistrate, Broach, and convicting the appellant for contravening the provisions of R. 65(1) of the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Rules, 1941, hereinafter called the Rules, and imposing on him a fine of Rs. 25.

(2.) The appellant was a trader carrying on business in cotton at Broach. On February 7 and 9, 1953, he purchased full pressed cotton bales from M/s. Ratanji Faranji and Sons in two instalments of 200 bales each through a licensed broker, Dahyabhai Acharatlal. He also purchased 100 bales from Halday Multi-Purposes Co-operative Society. All these purchases were made by the appellant as a trader in the market area of Broach without the requisite licence from the Market Committee. He was charged in the Court of the Joint Civil Judge (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Broach, for committing the breach of R. 65(1) of the Rules. The Judicial Magistrate held that pressed cotton was not cotton, ginned or unginned within the meaning of one of the items mentioned in the Schedule to the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act (hereinafter called "the Act"), and, therefore, the appellant did not commit any offence under the Act or the Rules framed thereunder. The State of Bombay carried the matter by way of appeal to the High Court of Bombay, and a Division Bench of the said High Court, consisting of Chainani and Shah JJ., allowed the appeal and convicted the appellant for contravening the provisions of R. 65(1) of the Rules and imposed upon him a fine of Rs. 25. This appeal challenges the correctness of the judgment of the High Court.

(3.) Learned Counsel for the appellant raised before us the following three contentions:(i) the Act and the Rules framed thereunder did not apply to pressed cotton, and, therefore, the appellant did not contravene the provisions of R. 65(1) of the Rules; (ii) R. 65 is ultra vires inasmuch as its provisions are in excess of the rule-making power of the State Government; and (iii) the transactions in question were forward contracts for future delivery, and, as no delivery was intended or in fact made, the appellant cannot be said to have traded in cotton within the market area.