STATE OF BIHAR Vs. HIRA LAL KEJRIWAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal by special leave by the State of Bihar against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Patna quashing the criminal proceedings launched against the respondents in the Court of Munsif-Magistrate, Patna.

(2.) The two respondents were the proprietors of a firm called M/s. Patna Textiles doing business in cotton at Patna. On 30-8-1955, they despatched two bales of saries to M/s. Hiralal Basudev Prasad, cloth merchants of balia, from Patna Ghat without obtaining a permit from the Textile Controller, Bihar. They were prosecuted under S. 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (X of 1955), hereinafter called the Act, read with S. 3 of the Cotton Textiles (Control of Movement) Order, 1948, hereinafter called the Order, in the Court of the Munsif-Magistrate, Patna. The respondents filed a petition before the said Munsif-Magistrate praying for their discharge on the ground that the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946(XXIV of 1946), hereinafter called the 1946 Act, whereunder the said Order was made, had been repealed, and therefore, the Order ceased to have any legal force thereafter, and consequently they could not be prosecuted under the expired Order. The Munsif-Magistrate rejected that petition. The Additional Sessions Judge, Patna, after perusing the records transmitted the same to the High Court under S. 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with his opinion that the order of the Munsif-Magistrate was wrong and, therefore, it might be set aside with the direction to the Munsif-Magistrate to discharge the accused. The respondents also filed a revision to the High Court against the order of the Munsif-Magistrate. The reference as well as the revision were heard together by Imam J., of the High Court at Patna, and the learned Judge accepting the reference and the revision set aside the order of the Munsif-Magistrate and directed the accused to be discharged. Hence the appeal.

(3.) The learned counsel appearing for the State contended that the Order made under the 1946 Act was saved under S. 16 of the Essential Commodities Ordinance of 1955, hereinafter called the Ordinance, and S. 16 (2) of the Act, and, therefore, the accused were validly prosecuted under the provisions of the Order. The learned counsel for the respondents argued that the order was not saved under either of the said two sections.