SAUMINDRA BHATTACHARYA Vs. STATE OF BIHAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal arises out of the following facts:

(2.) On 6th April, 1999, the complainant Ajay Paul, an advocate by profession, purchased three bottles of Limca from a retailer at village Digha. One of the bottles was opened by the complainant and on consuming the same, he fell sick, vomitted several times, felt nauseated, had loose motions and had to spend a sum of Rs.3,000/- on medicines etc. The complainant also examined one of the bottles of Limca which remained unopened and found that it contained several dust particles. The complainant thereupon served a notice dated 9th April 1999 by registered post on the three accused, accused No.1 being the President of M/s. Coca Cola India, accused No.2 the Consumer Affairs Coordinator and accused No.3 the Manager of M/s. Bharat Coca Cola Bottling North East Pvt. Ltd. Patna alleging that he had been caused injury on account of consumption of adulterated Limca. The complainant received a reply from the accused and it was pointed out therein that several such complaints had been received from other sources as well, and it appeared that Limca was being adulterated by some unscrupulous elements and an enquiry was going on in this connection. Dissatisfied with the said reply, the complainant filed a complaint under Sections 2, 16, 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, hereinafter 'the Act' for short, read with Section 320 of the IPC. The complainant and three other witnesses were examined by the Magistrate. In the meanwhile, the report of the Public Analyst, Bihar, Patna was received and was also appended by the complainant and cognizance was duly taken by the magistrate. These proceedings were challenged by the accused under Section 482 of the CrPC. The High Court, vide the impugned judgment, has quashed the proceedings qua accused Nos.1 and 2 but has dismissed the petition with respect to the Manager, accused No.3. Accused No.3 is before us in the present appeal.

(3.) Mr. Ashok Desai, the learned senior counsel for the appellant, has raised only one argument during the course of hearing. He has pointed out that the Act itself provided a specific means and method whereby a complaint by a private party relating to food adulteration had to be entertained and in the absence of the stipulated procedure having been followed, the Magistrate was not justified in even entertaining the complaint. In this connection, he has referred us to Sections 11, 12 and 20 of the Act.