SURAJ SINGH Vs. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Leave granted.

(2.) The appellants filed petitions under Section 5 of the Madhya Pradesh Samaj Ke Kamjor Vargon Ke Krishi Bhumi-Dharakon Ka Udhar Dene Walon Ke Bhumi Hadapane Sambhandhi Kuchakron Se Paritran Tatha Mukti Adhiniyam, 1976, (for short 'the Adhiniyam') and claimed relief under Section 7 of the Adhiniyam by asserting that they belong to the category of weaker section of the backward caste; that they borrowed amount from Jai Kumar Jain (husband of respondent No. 4 herein) and executed sale deed of land measuring 1.32 and 2.57 hectares respectively as security for return of the borrowed money; that they have repaid the loan within one year but instead of canceling the sale deeds, Jai Kumar Jain, in connivance with the revenue authorities, got the name of his wife, Smt. Sampat Bai, mutated in the revenue records.

(3.) The Sub-Divisional Officer, before whom petitions were filed issued notice to respondent No. 4, heard the parties and passed order dated 22.6.1999 whereby he declared the sale transactions as null and void under Section 7 of the Adhiniyam and directed the concerned Patwari to delete the land which was subject matter of sale deeds from the land record of respondent No. 4 and include the same in the land record of the petitioners (appellants herein). Respondent No. 4 challenged the order of the Sub Divisional Officer by filing appeals under Section 8 of the Adhiniyam, which were allowed by the Collector on the premise that the appellants do not belong to weaker section. The Collector observed that the Sub Divisional Officer did not conduct enquiry in accordance with Section 6 of the Adhiniyam and held that he could not have nullified the sale deeds on the basis of preliminary enquiry. The writ petitions filed by the appellants against the order of the Collector were dismissed by the learned Single Judge who confirmed the finding of the Collector that the provisions of the Adhiniyam are not applicable to the cases of the appellants herein. Writ appeals preferred by the appellants were dismissed by the Division Bench. Hence, these appeals by special leave.