REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER Vs. A ARUNA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Leave granted. We have heard learned counsel for the parties finally. This appeal arises out of the decision rendered by a Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh upsetting the majority view arrived at by two members of the Special Court functioning under the provisions of the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The appellants are the authorities functioning under the said Act. They had moved the Special Court on the ground that the respondents were in illegal possession and were land grabbers of a plot of land being plot No. 9 situated at Jubilee Hills in Hyderabad city. That application was moved in 1991. The Full Bench of the Special Court consisting of the Chairman and the two Members decided the said application after hearing the parties and after considering the evidence led by them and came to the conclusion that though the appellants had established their title to plot No. 9 it was adversely possessed by the respondents and, therefore, no relief could be granted to the appellants in the said proceedings. That decision was rendered on 31st October 1995.

(2.) The Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned order dated 25th November 1996, held that the review jurisdiction was wrongly sought to be invoked by the appellants and review proceedings were not maintainable. It was held that the first ground, namely, Ex.B-12 was inadmissible in evidence, could not be sustained for supporting the review petition as it was admitted in the evidence earlier without any objection. On the second ground it was held by the High Court that the earlier judgment on 31st October 1995 was based on the relevant facts, both oral and documentary, namely Exs.B-12 and B-13 and B-15 which were earlier judgments of the Special Court wherein it was held that for plot No. 9 situated at Jubilee Hills the State authorities had no title and the plot was a fully paid up plot belonging to the erstwhile occupants and consequently the earlier proceedings filed under the very same Act by the same appellants seeking eviction of alleged unauthorised occupants of this very plot were dismissed. It is also pertinent to note that nothing was brought out on the record of these proceedings to show that the earlier decisions of the very same Court at Exs.B-13 and B-15 which were relied upon by it while passing the order dated 31st October 1995 were ever carried higher up or were sub judice before any other higher authority. In fact such was not even the ground on which review was sought by the appellants. The High Court, therefore, took the view that when the earlier decision was rendered on consideration of all relevant facts and on appreciation of evidence, both oral and documentary, it could not be said that the said decision suffered from any patent error of fact which could have enabled the appellants to seek review of the said order under Section 17A of the Act. Consequently the writ petition was allowed and the majority decision of the Special Court seeking to review its earlier order was set aside.

(3.) Learned senior counsel Shri A. Raghuvir for the appellants fairly stated that he was pressing the case for review of the earlier order of the Special Court not on the ground that Ex. B-12 was wrongly held admissible in evidence but he strongly relied upon second ground for review, namely, that the earlier decision suffered from a clear error of fact which in his view was a glaring one and could be said to be an apparent or a patent error. He submitted that Ex.B-12 which was earlier relied upon by the Special Court in coming to the conclusion that it had reference to plot No. 9, in fact did not refer to plot No. 9 at all which was the disputed plot but it was concerned with plot No. 10 which was an adjoining plot. That is one patent error of fact which had crept in the earlier decision of the Special Court dated 31st October 1995. It was next contended by the learned senior counsel for the appellants that even that apart, the decision sought to be got reviewed relied upon two earlier judgments of the Special Court Exs. B-13 and B-15, which might have referred to plot No. 9 but those decisions had held that plot No. 9 did not belong to the Government but was a fully paid up plot which had passed on to the then occupant of the plot and did not remain in the ownership of the erstwhile municipality and consequently could not have been available to the State to claim its title thereon through the said erstwhile defunct municipality. Therefore, the finding reached by the Special Court in the present case on 31st October 1995 when it decided that the said plot belonged to the Government could not have been based on the earlier judgments Exs. B-13 and B-15 which clearly held to the contrary. This was another patent error of fact. It was next submitted that the High Court wrongly assumed that the Special Court while passing the impugned judgment seeking to review the earlier decision had already set it aside on merits and that while granting the review petition the entire matter was finally disposed of by the Court. On all these grounds it was vehemently contended that the review proceedings which were at the stage of hearing before the Special Court could not have been intercepted by the High Court, in exercising powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.