LAWS(SC)-1998-9-129

DEVENDRA NATH SINGH DEAD Vs. CIVIL JUDGE BASTI

Decided On September 23, 1998
DEVENDRA NATH SINGH Appellant
V/S
CIVIL JUDGE,BASTI Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The sole question for consideration in this appeal is whether the Prescribed Authority in exercise of his powers under Section 13-A of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 can reopen a matter already decided and readjudicate the question whether the two sons of the original land holder, deceased Devendra Nath Singh, namely Hamendra and Shailendra were major or minor. On a proceeding being initiated, pursuance to notice under Section 10(2) of the Act, the Prescribed Authority by his order dated 30th January, 1975 came to the conclusion that the deceased Devendra Nath Singh had no surplus land in his possession inasmuch as the two major sons Hamendra and Shailendra were entitled to their share in the property. Shortly thereafter a fresh notice was issued by the said Prescribed Authority in purported exercise of his power under Section 13-A of the Act, intimating thereunder that some other land has not been taken into account. In course of the subsequent proceeding which stood initiated, the Prescribed Authority came to the conclusion that the two sons of the deceased Devendra Nath, namely, Shailendra and Hamendra were not major on the appointed date and, therefore, they would not be entitled to any share while computing the surplus land in the hands of deceased Devendra Nath Singh. the land holder contested the proceeding on several grounds including the grounds that the Prescribed Authority had no jurisdiction to reopen the question of majority of the two sons, in exercise of his power under Section 13-A of the Act. The said contention, however, was negatived by the Authorities under the Act as well as by the High Court on the ground that Section 38-B clearly indicates that no finding or decision given before the commencement of the said section can be treated as bar against the principle of res judicata and, therefore, the Prescribed Authority could annul its earlier decision on the question of majority of the two sons, Hamendra and Shailendra.

(2.) The learned counsel appearing for the appellants contends that the power under Section 38-B will not enlarge the power of redetermination of surplus land conferred on the Prescribed Authority under Section 13-A of the Act and, therefore, the Prescribed Authority did not have the jurisdiction to reopen the question of the majority of the two sons. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent on the other hand contended that the land holder having subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the Prescribed Authority and having lead evidence in the proceeding after the matter was reopened, is not entitled to challenge the jurisdiction of the authority and, therefore, the findings arrived at by those authorities cannot be annulled at this point of time.

(3.) Having examined the provisions of Section 13-A and Section 38-B of the Act, we are of the considered opinion that under Section 13-A the Prescribed Authority has the power to reopen the matter within two years from the date of the notification under sub-section (4) of Section 14 to rectify any apparent mistake which was there on the face of the record. That power will certainly not include the power to entertain fresh evidence and re-examine the question as to whether the two sons, namely, Hamendra and Shailendra were major or not. The power under Section 38-B merely indicates that if any finding or decision was there by any ancillary forum prior to the commencement of the said Section in respect of a matter which is governed by the Ceiling Act then such findings will not operate as res judicata in a proceeding under the Act. That would not cover the case where findings have already reached its finality in the very case under the Act. In this view of the matter we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the Prescribed Authority had no jurisdiction to reopen the question of majority of the two sons in purported exercise of the power under Section 13-A. If the Authority had no jurisdiction, question of waiver of jurisdiction does not arise, as contended by learned counsel for the respondent.