PUNJAB WAKF BOARD Vs. BACHAN CHAND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The principal controversy in this appeal centres around the question as to whether the Punjab Wakf Board (Board) can lawfully invoke the jurisdiction of the civil court in respect of wakf property which was once declared as evacuee property on account of the migration of the trustees of the wakf to the areas now forming a part of Pakistan.

(2.) A suit for possession was instituted by the appellant Punjab Wakf Board against the respondent who was in possession of wakf land to the extent of 9 kanals and 13 niarlas in Village Bassi Babu Khan in Hoshiarpur District of Punjab. The defence of the respondent defendant was that he was a tenant under the Wakf Board and was liable to pay Rs. 15. 00 per kanal per annum as rent but he pleaded that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The trial court concluded that the respondent-defendant was a tenant but came to the conclusion that he could be evicted only by the revenue court and not by the civil court. The lower appellate court took a contrary view. It formed the opinion that (1 the respondent-defendant had failed to establish that he was a tenant and (2 that the civil court did have the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Accordingly, the lower appellate court allowed the appeal preferred by the Wakf Board and decreed the suit against the respondent-defendant. The matter wascarried by the defendant to the High court by way of second appeal. The High court has taken the view that the civil court had no jurisdiction inasmuch as S. 11 of the Administration of the Evacuee Property Act was attracted and that S. 15 of the Punjab Wakf Board Act, 1954 had no overriding effect vis-a-vis the said provision. In this view of the matter, the High court allowed the appeal preferred by the defendant, reversed the decree passed by the lower appellate court, and dismissed the 'suit for possession instituted by the Wakf Board. Thereupon the Punjab Wakf Board has approached this court by way of present appeal by special leave.

(3.) The validity of the view taken by the Punjab High court as on the date when the judgment was rendered need not be examined for reasons which will become evident presently. Subsequent to the decision of the High court giving rise to the present appeal, Wakf Act of 1954 has been amended and a new provision has been incorporated. The provision in question has been embodied in S. 66-H1 of the Act by virtue of Wakf (Amendment) Act of 1984 which has been given retrospective effect from the date of the enforcement of the Act. It has been provided therein that this provision shall be deemed always to have been on the statute book notwithstanding anything contained in any other provisions of the Act Having regard to the aforesaid newly added provision, a wakf property would vest in the Wakf Board in the same manner nd the same effect as in a trustee of such property for the purposes of Ss. (1 of S. 11 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. 1950 with effect fromthe date of such entrustment. In the present case, the wakf property has been handed over to the Wakf Board as a trustee pursuant to an order dated 31/01/1961 issued under the signature of the Additional Custodian, Jullandar, Punjab. The averment made in the pleading that the wakf property had been so handed over to the Board was not controvert by the other side. Nor has the correctness of this fact been disputed before this court. Under the circumstances, having regard to the provision contained in S. 66-H, the property must be treated as having vested in the Wakf Board with effect from the date on which it was entrusted to the Board by the Custodian under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 in 1961. The Wakf Board, therefore, was entitled to maintain an action for possession against the respondent-defendant having regard to the subsequent development in the form of amendment of the law in the context of the incorporation of a new provision, viz. S. 66-H. during the pendency of this appeal, which has been seven retrospective operation. The plea of bar of jurudiction can no longer survive in view of the legislative changes particularly having regard to the fact that S. 15 (1read with S. 15 (2 of the Act empowers and authorizes the Board to institute a suit in respect of a property vesting unto the Board. The impediment arising in the context of the fact that the former trustees had become evacuees and new trustees had not been appointed has lost its relevance. For. now the Board can maintain the action by virtue of the authority conferred by S. 15 (1 read with S. 15 (2 (i) of the Act.